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A Theoretical Framework for Understanding
Financial Distortions: With Special Application to
China
Guangdong Xut & Michael Faurett
Abstract: We attempt to explore the political roots of financially
distorting policies ("FDP") by building a simple demand-supply
framework in this study. On the demand side, in many countries,
including non-democratic ones but particularly in democratic
ones, interest groups are attracted by rents associated with FDP
and therefore devote resources to distort financial policies to their
advantage. On the supply side, governments, particularly
governments in non-democratic regimes, are inclined to adopt
FDP to channel financial resources to the key constituents of their
regimes in exchange for their loyalty and support. The framework
is shown to be useful in understanding financial situations in
certain countries, such as China, where a highly distorted
financial environment has been maintained for decades.
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I. Introduction
The relationship between financial development and economic
growth has been of great interest for economists over the past three
decades and has attracted numerous empirical studies that use
country-level, industry-level, and firm-level data to explore this
issue. The evidence as a whole tends to favor the argument that
finance and financial regulation matter for, or even cause, economic
growth.' In two survey papers, Levine concludes that the evidence
"suggests a positive, first-order relationship between financial
development and economic growth," 2 and "taken as a whole, the
bulk of existing research suggests that countries with better
functioning banks and markets grow faster." In a survey paper that
uses meta-analysis methods, Valickova, Havranek, and Horvath
also report that "the literature as a whole documents a moderate, but
statistically significant, positive link between financial development
and economic growth."4 As a report issued by the World Bank
1 However, more recent studies challenge the conventional wisdom that finance
unconditionally, linearly, and monotonically contributes to or even causes economic
growth. See generally Jean Louis Arcand, Enrico Berkes & Ugo Panizza, Too Much
Finance?, 20 J. ECON. GROWTH 105 (2015) (showing that the finance-growth nexus is now
understood to be non-linear, non-monotonic, and context-dependent).
2 Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda,
35 J. EcON. LITERATURE 688, 688 (1997).
3 Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence, in HANDBOOK OF
EcONOMIC GROWTH: VOL 1, PT. A 865, 868 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds.,
2005).
4 Petra Valickova, Tomas Havranek & Roman Horvath, Financial Development and
Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis, 29 J. EcoN. SURVS. 506, 522 (2015).
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concludes, "finance is central to development."
However, a financial system can hardly be expected to function
effectively, and therefore contribute to economic growth, without
certain institutional and legal underpinnings that can be relied upon
to address certain weaknesses inherent in a financial system. On the
micro level, financial institutions, such as banks, may use their
informational advantages to exploit their clients and therefore lead
to severe agency problems.6 On the macro level, excessive financial
development (such as credit growth exceeding real output growth)
may lead to financial volatility or even crises, which in turn exerts
a negative influence on output growth, as shown by Ductor and
Grechyna7 and Sahay et al.'
It is therefore necessary to create and maintain a legal and
regulatory system to sustain financial development by, for example,
improving information transparency, limiting moral hazard, and
restricting excessive risk exposure. Indeed, the financial sector is
among the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy around
the world, and numerous policy tools and regulatory arrangements
have been invented to correct market failures in the financial sector.
Unfortunately, the real effects of these tools and arrangements are
5 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL FiNANcIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013: RETHINKING THE
ROLE OF THE STATE IN FINANCE 17 (2012).
6 See generally, e.g., Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, How
Pervasive is Corporate Fraud?, 29-30 (Rotman School of Mgmt. Working Paper No.
2222608, 2013), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstractid=2222608
[https://perma.cc/L463-4EEF] (estimating that the cost of mostly financial fraud among
U.S. companies with more than $750 million in revenues is $380 billion annually); Luigi
Zingales, Presidential Address: Does Finance Benefit Society?, 70 J. FIN. 1327, 1347-48
(2015) (noting that, from January 2012 to December 2014, financial institutions paid
United States enforcement fines totaling $138 billion, and lamenting, "I fear that in the
financial sector fraud has become a feature and not a bug").
7 Lorenzo Ductor & Daryna Grechyna, Financial Development, Real Sector, and
Economic Growth, 37 INT'L REv. EcoN. & FIN. 393, 403 (2015) (noting that
"[a]cceleration of financial development that is not accompanied by growth in the real
sector reduces positive effect of financial development on growth; this effect might
become negative if financial development grows substantially faster than real output").
8 Ratna Sahay et al., Rethinking Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth in
Emerging Markets, IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/15/08, at 30 (May 2015),
https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdnl508.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBY5-
72YV] (noting that "analysis uncovers evidence of'too much finance' in recent years-
that is, beyond a certain level of financial development the benefits to growth begin to
decline and costs in terms of economic and financial volatility begin to rise").
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debated.' Even worse, certain policy and regulatory tools are
intentionally designed and implemented to intervene in the
operation of financial markets, distort the allocation of financial
resources, and prevent the financial intermediaries from functioning
at their full capacity rather than strengthening and improving the
functioning of financial markets.
We will refer to these tools as financially distorting policies
("FDP").10 FDP include (but are not limited to) interest rate
ceilings, capital account controls, restrictions on market entry into
the financial sector, credit ceilings or restrictions on the direction of
credit allocation, the government's ownership or control of banks,
and the bailing out of failed institutions with public funds. The
influence of FDP has been tested by numerous empirical studies,
many of which have identified a negative association between FDP
and certain economic variables, such as savings rates, investment,
and economic growth.' Negative effects on economic growth have
been demonstrated with respect to interest rate distortions,
1 2 but also
9 Compare Puspa Delima Amri & Brett Matthew Kocher, The Political Economy of
Financial Sector Supervision andBanking Crises: A Cross-Country Analysis, 18 EUR. L.
J. 24 (2012) (highlighting the important role of financial regulation and supervision in
reconciling the benefits of enhanced economic growth along with its costs), with JAMES R.
BARTH, GERARD CAPRIO JR. & Ross LEVINE, RETHINKING BANK REGULATION: TILL
ANGELs GOVERN 12 (paperback ed. 2008) (concluding that "empowering direct official
supervision of banks and strengthening capital standards do not boost bank development,
improve bank efficiency, reduce corruption in lending, or lower banking system fragility").
io The term "FDP" is basically interchangeable with, but slightly broader than, the
term "financial repression," which can be traced back to the work of Ronald McKinnon's
Money and Capital in Economic Development (1973) and Edward Shaw's Financial
Deepening in Economic Development (1973). FDP is slightly broader in the sense that
certain FDP, such as governments bailing out failed financial institutions, are not covered
by the theory of financial repression but will be addressed under the umbrella of FDP. See
generally Hiro Ito, Financial Repression, in 2 THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
WORLD EcoNOMY 430-33 (Kenneth Reinert & Ramkishen Rajan eds., 2008) (offering a
description of the concept of financial repression); Guangdong Xu & Michael Faure,
Financial Repression in China: Short-term Growth but Long-term Crisis?, 42 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 13 (2019) (providing more general discussions on financial
repression).
ii For a general discussion on the role of FDP in economic development, see
Konstantinos Loizos, The Financial Repression-Liberalization Debate: Taking Stock,
Looking for Synthesis, 32 J. EcoN. SuRvs. 440 (2017) (reviewing the theoretical
contributions and empirical studies of the financial repression-liberalization debate).
12 See, e.g., Maxwell J. Fry, Money and Capital or Financial Deepening in Economic
Development, 10 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 464 (1978); Maxwell J. Fry, In Favour
of Financial Liberalisation, 107 EcoN. J. 754 (1997); Nouriel Roubini & Xavier Sala-i-
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with respect to regulatory restrictions on bank competition.13
Several studies have equally shown the negative effects of state
ownership in the banking sector.4 These studies have empirically
shown the negative relationship between FDP and economic
growth. However, another important dimension of FDP, i.e., the
causes of FDP, particularly the political roots of FDP, seems to have
attracted much less attention in the literature." An important piece
of the puzzle seems to be missing.
We attempt to fill this gap in this study. More specifically, we
build a simple supply-demand framework to explore the political
factors that may determine the existence and persistence of FDP.
From the supply side, as the exclusive provider of public policies
and economic regulations, the government (or the politicians who
control the government) may distort financial markets so that
valuable financial resources will be channeled to certain
Martin, Financial Repression and Economic Growth, 39 J. DEv. EcoN. 5, 29 (1992)
(noting that their work had "confirmed ... that financial repression affects growth
negatively, inflation rates and growth rates are negatively related and reserve ratios and
growth are negatively related").
13 See generally, e.g., BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 9 (presenting a new
database on bank regulation in over 150 countries and offering a comprehensive cross-
country assessment of the impact of bank regulation on the operation of banks); Allen N.
Berger et al., Bank Concentration and Competition: An Evolution in the Making, 36 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 433 (2004) (reviewing the existing literature on the impact of
bank concentration and competition).
14 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, FINANCE FOR GROWTH: POLICY CHOICES IN A VOLATILE
WORLD 131 (2001) (observing that data indicates "state banks ... tend to decrease
financial sector development and economic growth, to concentrate credit, and to increase
the likelihood and cost of banking crises."); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
& Andrei Shleifer, Government Ownership ofBanks, 57 J. FIN. 265, 267 (2002) (finding
"that higher government ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent
development of the financial system, lower economic growth, and, in particular, lower
growth of productivity").
15 Certain studies attempt to explain FDP by referring to the fiscal needs of
governments. See, e.g., Chong-En Bai et al., Financial Repression and Optimal Taxation,
70 EcoN. LETTERS 245 (2001); Alberto Giovannini & Martha de Melo, Government
Revenue from Financial Repression, 83 A. EcoN. REv. 953 (1993); Yothin Jinjarak,
Economic Integration and Government Revenue from Financial Repression, 37 EcON.
Sys. 271 (2013); Victor Menaldo, The Fiscal Roots of Financial Underdevelopment, 60
A. J. POL. Sc. 456, 456 (2016) (arguing that "the state might ... have its own fiscal
reasons for politicizing the supply and price of credit, since financial repression provides
easy-to-collect revenues.. . . the state's fiscal imperative is usually the primary reason
behind financial repression, and even when private actors benefit, they are subordinate to
this concern" and that "strong empirical support [exists] for [his] fiscal transaction cost
theory").
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constituents whose support is critical for the survival of the
government (or the controlling politicians). From the demand side,
the administration, legislature, and regulatory agencies may be
captured by powerful elites and interest groups; as a result, financial
policies and regulations and their enforcement will be distorted to
benefit these elites and interest groups at the cost of economic
efficiency and social welfare. These two mechanisms may function
separately or jointly; either way, the financial policies are distorted.
Our theoretical framework allows us to understand why in different
legal systems, including the United States, governments often adopt
financially distorting policies. But we will show that the theoretical
framework we develop is equally applicable to explain the
emergence of FDP in new economies such as China. Our study
therefore contributes to the literature by showing that the political
economy context is essential for understanding the performance of
a financial system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section
II, we offer a demand side analysis by discussing the role of interest
groups in shaping FDP. The influence of supply side, i.e., the
connection between the nature of regimes and financial distortions,
will be addressed in section III. The results of the demand and
supply-side analyses will be combined by summarizing the shape of
the market for FDP in section IV. And in section V, China will be
used as a case illustration for the theoretical framework presented
in this study. Finally, we conclude in section VI.
H. The Demand for Financially Distorting Regulation
We start by explaining the emergence of financially distorting
regulation by focusing on the demand for regulation. In part A, we
explain that FDP create rents which may benefit interest groups,
which is precisely the reason why they will devote substantial
resources to lobby the creation of FDP. Part B demonstrates that
the result is that interest groups, more particularly banks and other
financial institutions, are quite successful in creating policies that
are beneficial to them, and they are also influential in policy
implementation. Part C discusses interest groups, as beneficiaries
of FDP have different advantages which may explain their success.
Finally, Part D examines why reforming or abolishing FDP
therefore becomes extremely difficult.
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A. Interest Groups and Rent-Seeking
The key to understanding the existence and persistence of FDP
is that once FDP are in place, tremendous economic rents" will be
generated. In the literature of political economy, economic rents
usually refer to the abnormal profits earned by politically favored
entities with the help of certain governmental policies, such as
licenses, tariffs, and other regulatory arrangements.1 7 Themeaning
of economic rents in the context of the financial sector may be
illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the impact of interest rate
ceilings, one of the most commonly used strategies of FDP. With
an interest rate ceiling set at ro, which is below the market-clearing
equilibrium rate, rE, the demand for loanable funds, L 2 , greatly
exceeds the available supply, Li. This excess demand calls for the
rationing of the limited supply, and more importantly, those who
have access to the rationed credit are entitled to the rents that arise
from the difference between the low, regulated loan rate and the
market-clearing rate.
Certainly, rents can be created by other policy distortions. For
example, incumbent banks may enjoy rents if entry into the banking
industry is highly restricted, listed firms may enjoy rents if the
procedure of initial public offering is extremely inconvenient, and
certain export industries and enterprises may enjoy rents if the
currency is artificially depreciated. The magnitude of rents can be
tremendous. For example, Huang reports that in China, financial
rents (in the form of artificially low interest rates of bank loans)
received by the Chinese enterprise sector amounted to CNY 607
billion, or 2 percent of its GDP, in 2008. Similarly, Reinhart and
Sbrancia report that for advanced economies, real interest rates were
16 An economic rent, according to Tollison, "is a payment to a resource owner above
the amount his resources could command in their next best alternative use .... [Put
otherwise, it] is a receipt in excess of the opportunity cost of a resource." Robert D.
Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575, 577 (1982).
17 See GERRIT DE GEEST, RENTS: How iARKETING CAUSES INEQUALITY (2018)
(providing further discussion on rents).
18 See Yiping Huang, China's Great Ascendancy and Structural Risks:
Consequences of Asymmetric Market Liberalization, 24 ASIAN-PAc. EcoN. LIT. 65, 78
(2010). Yiping Huang& Kunyu Tao confirmed this phenomenon over an extended period,
measuring rents as they varied with policy distortions from 2000 to 2008 and finding that
financial rents were highest in 2000, when they were the equivalent of 4.1% of GDP;
Yiping Huang & Kunyu Tao, Factor Market Distortion and the Current Account Surplus
in China, 9 ASIAN ECON. PAPERS 1, 22-23, 26 (2010).
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negative in about half of the years during the 1945-1980 period; as
a result of this repression policy, the average annual interest expense






Figure 1. The Effects of Interest-Rate Ceilings on Loanable Funds
As the literature of rent-seeking has shown, rents will attract
rent-seeking efforts by certain interest groups,2 0which will in turn
translate into politically favorable arrangements through which
economic rents can be effectively entrenched.2 1  Generally
19 See Carmen M. Reinhart &M. Belen Sbrancia, The Liquidation ofGovernment
Debt, 30EcoN. POL'Y 291, 291 (2015).
20 In certain extreme cases, rent-seeking expenditures may even overweigh the rents
and therefore lead to acomplete dissipation of rents. See Toke S. Aidt, Rent Seeking and
the Economics of Corruption, 27 CONST. POL. EcoN. 142, 152 (2016); Ignacio Del Rosal,
The Empirical Measurement ofRent-Seeking Costs, 25J. EcON. SUnvs. 298, 299 (2011).
21 Certain studies show that lobbying expenditures by interest groups effectively
influence trade policies (their levels of trade protection). See Jeffrey M. Drope &Wendy
L. Hansen, Purchasing Protection? The Effect ofPolitical Spending onU.S. Trade Poliy,
57 POL. REs.Q.27 (2004); Patricia Tovar, Lobbying Costs and Trade Policy, 83 J.INT.
EcoN. 126, 126-36 (2011). Amy McKay further reports "finding surprisingly little
relationship between organizations' financial resources and their policy success - but
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speaking, policies and regulations can be distorted by rent-seekers
through two means:22 (1) rent-seekers may fundamentally change
the rules of the game by manipulating the legislative process
through which certain distorting policies, laws, and regulations will
be issued; or (2) rent-seekers may bypass the legislative process and
leave the current (efficient) policies and laws intact but turn to
sabotaging their enforcement by corrupting regulatory agencies
who are responsible for enforcing these policies and laws. Either
way, resource allocation is distorted, and economic efficiency is
sacrificed.
Numerous studies have shown that different interest groups use
different rent-seeking strategies in different economic and political
environments. For example, using data for approximately 4,000
firms in 25 transition countries, Campos and Giovannoni find that
it is more likely for a firm to join a lobbying group (rule-changing
activity) if the firm is large, foreign-owned, and located in a country
that is more economically developed and more politically stable.23
Campos and Giovannoni further show that lobbying and corruption
(enforcement-sabotaging activity) are substitutes (a significantly
negative connection between lobbying and corruption is
identified).2 4 Similarly, Harstad and Svensson build a model
showing that on the micro level, large firms tend to lobby and small
firms tend to bribe (enforcement-sabotaging), and on the macro
level, firms lobby in rich countries but bribe in poor countries.2 5
Naoi and Krauss further show that the organizational structure of
interest groups, in particular, whether they are centralized or
decentralized, substantially affects their lobbying strategies
greater money is linked to certain lobbying tactics and traits, and some of these are linked
to greater policy success." Amy McKay, Buying Policy? The Effects of Lobbyists'
Resources on Their Policy Success, 65 POL. REs. Q. 908, 908 (2012).
22 Certainly, there are other channels through which interest groups may influence
the process of financial development, such as resorting to the judiciary. See Thomas T.
Holyoke, Choosing Battlegrounds: Interest Group Lobbying Across Multiple Venues, 56
POL. REs. Q. 325, 325 (2003) (creating a model and testing it "with data from interviews
with lobbyists for groups that were active on the issue of financial modernization between
1997 and 1999").
23 See Nauro F. Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, Lobbying, Corruption and
PoliticalInfluence, 131 PUB. CHOICE 1, 20 (2007).
24 Id. at 17.
25 See BArd Harstad & Jakob Svensson, Bribes, Lobbying, and Development, 105
Am. POL. Sc. Rv. 46, 56-57 (2011).
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(targeting politicians or bureaucrats).26
B. Evidence ofSuccessfil Rent-Seeking
The beneficiaries of FDP, such as financial institutions, are
indeed highly involved in the political process in terms of political
contributions and lobbying expenditure. For example, McCarty,
Poole, and Rosenthal report that in the United States, the campaign
contribution from the financial sector increased almost threefold
between 1992 and 2008, and the magnitude of contribution from the
financial industry to political campaigns is the highest among all
industries.2 7 Such spending is indeed rewarding. Evidence shows
that thanks to its lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions,
the financial industry enjoyed favorable policies before the financial
crisis of 2008 and received generous bailouts during the financial
crisis. Igan and Mishra report that in the United States, from 1999
to 2006, spending on lobbying by the financial industry was
positively associated with the probability of a legislator changing
positions in favor of deregulation.2 8 Mian, Sufi and Trebbi find that
there is a positive relation between the amount of financial service
industry campaign contributions received by a politician and the
probability of his (or her) voting for the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act29 (also known as the Troubled Asset Relief
Program, "TARP"), which was enacted in October 2008 and
enables the Treasury Department to recapitalize banks through
direct purchase of new equity and severely distressed mortgage
backed securities up to $700 billion. 0 The connection between
campaign contributions and legislative voting for TARP is further
confirmed by other studies.3 1
26 See Megumi Naoi & Ellis Krauss, Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics
under Alternative Electoral Systems, 53 AM. J. POL. Sci. 874, 889 (2009).
27 See NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOwARD ROSENTHAL, POLITICAL
BUBBLES: FINANCIAL CRISES AND THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 117-48
(Princeton Univ. Press ed., 2013).
28 Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra, Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street: Political
Influence and Financial Regulation, 57 J. L. & EcON. 1063, 1063 (2014).
29 See Atif Mian, Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, The Political Economy ofthe US
Mortgage Default Crisis, 100 AM. EcoN. REv. 1967, 1988 (2010).
30 Id. at 1968.
31 See generally, e.g., Jim F. Couch et al., An Analysis of the Financial Services
Bailout Vote, 31 CATO J. 119 (2011) (constructing a model to analyze the bailout vote of
each legislator); Michael Dorsch, Bailoutfor Sale? The Vote to Save Wall Street, 155 PUB.
[Vol. XLVN.C. J. INT'L L.718
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In addition to political contributions and lobbying expenditure,
there are other channels through which policies may be influenced.
Duchin and Sosyura show that in addition to campaign
contributions and lobbying expenditure, other political connections,
such as employing a director who worked at the Treasury or one of
the banking regulators, or headquartered in the election districts of
House members on key financial committees, also help a financial
firm to access the federal rescue funds from the TARP.3 2 Blau,
Brough, and Thomas report that financial firms that lobbied during
the five years prior to the TARP (or have other political
connections) are not only more likely to receive TARP funds but
also to receive a greater amount of TARP support and to receive the
support earlier than firms that are not politically involved."
Certainly, interest groups shape financial policies not only in the
United States and not only at present. Historically, studies report
that interest groups in the United States influenced the intensity of
a variety of regulations. Benmelech and Moskowitz, for example
showed the influence of interest groups on the severity of state usury
laws in the 19th century. They report that state suffrage laws that
restrict who can vote based on land ownership and tax payments
(not race or gender) keep political power in the hands of wealthy
incumbents, and that such wealth-based voting restrictions are
highly correlated with financial restrictions (tighter usury laws)."
Also, the development of the banking sector in the early 20th
century was influenced by interest groups.3 6 Counties in the United
CHOICE 211 (2013) (noting studies that confirm the connection between campaign
contributions and legislative voting for TARP).
32 See Ran Duchin & Denis Sosyura, The Politics of Government Investment, 106 J.
FIN. ECON. 24, 26 (2012).
33 Benjamin M. Blau, Tyler J. Brough & Diana W. Thomas, Corporate Lobbying,
Political Connections, and the Bailout ofBanks, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3007, 3007 (2013).
34 See Efraim Benmelech & Tobias J. Moskowitz, The Political Economy of
Financial Regulation: Evidencefrom U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century, 65 J. FIN.
1029, 1070-71 (2010).
35 See id. at 1070-71 (noting, among other things, that "[o]ur evidence suggests that
incumbents with political power prefer stringent usury laws because they impede
competition from potential new entrants who are credit rationed ... [;] that financial
regulation is correlated with other restrictive political and economic policies adopted by
the state designed to exclude other groups and protect incumbent interests ... [; and, that]
[t]he collection of evidence supports the private interest view of financial regulation and
highlights the political economy of financial development").
36 See generally Raghuram G. Rajan & Rodney Ramcharan, Land and Credit: A
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States where the agricultural elite had disproportionately large land
holdings had significantly fewer banks per capita; in addition, credit
appears to have been more costly, and access to it more limited, in
these counties." The reason is that large landowners may restrict
financial development in order to limit access to finance, so that
they may extract more rents from tenants and small farmers.
3 8 The
timing of branching deregulation in the banking sector in the last
quarter of the 20th century was also related to the influence of
interest groups." Interest group factors related to the relative
strength of potential winners (large banks and small, bank-
dependent firms) and losers (small banks and the rival insurance
firms) can explain the timing of branching deregulation across the
states.40
The process of financial development in the United States is
therefore argued to be shaped by political battles between the
winners and losers of financial development.4 ' Witko argues that
the interests of low-income individuals and the working class are
harmed by the process of financial development, whereas the firms
in the financial industry appear to be the major beneficiary.
Between 1949 and 2005, the struggles between the organizations
and parties representing the losers versus those representing the
winners shaped the financial landscape of the United States to a
large extent. Thus, "when groups representing the losers of
financialization are less powerful, this process advances more
rapidly ... when the financial industry is more active in politics,
financialization proceeds more rapidly."42
From a comparative perspective, Rajan and Zingales examine
the financial development of twenty-four countries during the 20th
century and find that the state of development in the financial sector
Study ofthe Political Economy ofBanking in the United States in the Early 20th Century,
66 J. FIN. 1895 (2011) (describing how large landholders restricted the development of
banking and finance in early 20th century America).
37 Id. at 1895.
38 Id. at 1896-97.
39 Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, What Drives Deregulation? Economics
andPolitics ofthe Relaxation ofBankBranching Restrictions, 114 Q. J. EcoN. 1437,1437
(1999).
40 Id.
41 See Christopher Witko, The Politics ofFinancialization in the United States, 1946-
2005, 46 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 349, 364 (2014).
42 Id. at 349.
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does not change monotonically over time.43  They therefore apply
interest group theory to explain the rise and fall of financial markets
in these countries. They argue that incumbents, both in the financial
sector and in industry, have a vested interest in preventing financial
development because a more efficient financial system facilitates
entry and encourages competition, which leads to lower profits for
incumbent firms and financial institutions. However, when a
country's borders are open to both trade and capital flows, the
incentives and abilities of incumbents to oppose financial
development are muted and financial development will flourish.44
This theory, by Rajan and Zingales, concerning the relationship
between the influence of interest groups and the rise and fall of
financial markets has been further tested and confirmed by other
studies.
Interest groups may not only influence policy design but also
policy implementation. For example, Heinemann and Schiller find
that there is a negative connection between the size of the banking
industry and the strength of the regulatory regime, implying that
banks may use their influence to alleviate regulatory stringency.46
One explanation for the relative success of interest groups relates to
the phenomenon of the "revolving door" between financial
institutions and their regulators. The term "revolving door" refers
to "the movement of individuals back and forth between public
office and private companies, in order to exploit their period of
service to the benefit of their current employer."4 7 The "revolving
43 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of
Financial Development in the 20th Century, 69 J. FIN. EcoN. 5, 5, 14-17 (2003).
44 Id. at 7, 17-19.
45 See, e.g., Matias Braun & Claudio E. Raddatz, The Politics of Financial
Development: Evidence from Trade Liberalization, 63 J. FIN. 1469 (2008) (finding the
"benefits ofdeveloping the financial system are insufficient for financial development, and
rents in particular hands appear to be necessary to achieve it."); David Hauner, Alessandro
Prati & Cagatay Bircan, The Interest Group Theory ofFinancial Development: Evidence
from Regulation, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 895, 895 (2013) (noting that "[i]n line with the
theory [of interest group financial development put forward by Rajan and Zingales in
2003], we find strong evidence that trade liberalization is a leading indicator of domestic
financial liberalization .... [but], in contrast to the theory, we do not find consistent
evidence of an effect of capital account liberalization").
46 Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Schiller, A Stiglerian View on Banking
Supervision, 121 PUB. CHOICE 99, 121 (2004).
47 Transparency International, Regulating the Revolving Door 2 (Working Paper No.
06/2010) (2010).
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door" can move in two directions. The first direction is from the
government to the private sector, i.e., public officials (elected or
appointed) and civil servants move to lucrative private sector
positions, where they may use their government experience and
connections to unfairly benefit their new employer.48 The second
direction is from the private sector to the government, such as
appointing corporate executives to key public offices and posts in
government, which may raise the possibility of a pro-business bias
in policy formulation and regulatory enforcement.4
9 The result of
this interest group influence is the well-known problem of
"regulatory capture."so Regulatory capture is "the result or process
by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or
repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the
interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the
industry itself."" In the context of the financial sector, regulatory
capture is described as a situation "in which bankers enjoy large
rents, in return for which they were willing to finance government
expenditures, within certain constraints, and to do other favors for
government officials."52
The result of regulatory capture, and the corresponding
influence of interest groups on financial regulation is precisely the
financial distortion central to this article. Many studies have shown
48 See Ernesto Dal B6, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. EcoN.POL'Y
203, 214 (2006).
49 See id.
5o The theory of regulatory capture can be traced back to the early work of Nobel
Prize Winner George Stigler, as well as the work of Sam Peltzman. George J. Stigler, The
Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Scl. 3 (1971); Sam Peltzman,
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976). However,
nowadays, the value of this theory to fully explain incentives and the behavior of
regulatory agencies is debated. For a critical account, see DANIEL CARPENTER & DAVID
A. Moss, PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND How TO
LIMrr IT (2014).
si Introduction, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST
INFLUENCE AND How To Limi IT 13 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014). In
the literature, both broad and narrow interpretations of regulatory capture are presented.
The broad interpretation defines regulatory capture as "the process through which special
interests affect state intervention in any of its forms, which can include areas as diverse as
the setting of taxes, the choice of foreign or monetary policy, or the legislation affecting
R&D," whereas the narrow interpretation describes regulatory capture as "the process
through which regulated monopolies end up manipulating the state agencies that are
supposed to control them." See Dal B6, supra note 48, at 203.
52 BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 9, at 35.
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how interest groups' influence in the financial sector leads to pervert
financial regulation and the corresponding distortions. For
example, Baxter argues that "examples of recent strong industry
bias on the part of key financial regulators seem to abound. There
is ample evidence from various regulatory actions that the industry,
particularly large financial organizations, have enjoyed surprising
favor at the hands of the financial regulators."" Related to the
financial crisis, it was even argued that "in large part, the latest crisis
[the financial crisis of 2008] was also attributable to the regulators'
failure to maintain their independence from the financial industry
and to act in a truly public minded manner-the phenomena
commonly associated with the concept of regulatory capture."5 4
Gadinis further shows that since the financial crisis of 2008,
concerns about regulatory capture have led to a paradigm shift in
fifteen OECD countries in which more regulatory powers are
allocated to politically controlled officials, such as treasury
secretaries and finance ministers, rather than to independent
agencies." Levitin undertook a literature review examining six
books dealing with the financial crisis of 2008.56 As a result of this
study, he argues that regulatory capture should be blamed for
enabling the financial crisis." However, some empirical studies
provide a more balanced picture." Those studies argue that the
available empirical evidence is inconsistent with the "regulatory
capture" hypothesis, but consistent with a "regulatory schooling"
hypothesis (i.e., workers in the private sector may move into the
regulatory sector to get schooled in the new complexity and then
move from regulation to the private sector to earn the returns from
53 Lawrence G. Baxter, 'Capture' in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It
Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 181 (2011).
54 Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in
Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 629 (2012).
55 Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101
CALiF. L. REv. 327, 332 (2013).
56 Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of
Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REv. 1991, 1992 (2014).
57 See id at 2068.
ss See, e.g., David Lucca, Amit Seru & Francesco Trebbi, The Revolving Door and
Worker Flows in Banking Regulation, 65 J. MONETARY EcON. 17 (2014); Sophie A. Shive
& Margaret M. Forster, The Revolving Doorfor Financial Regulators, 21 REv. FIN. 1445
(2017).
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regulatory schooling)."
C. Advantages Enjoyed by Interest Groups
In part A (above), we showed that interest groups in the financial
sector have incentives to develop rent-seeking activities and will
devote substantial efforts to rent-seeking. Moreover, in Part B, we
showed that interest groups usually will prevail in the political
battlefield because they have the will and resources to influence
political and regulatory processes. However, the success of the
interest groups leading to financially distorting regulation is equally
due to specific structural advantages of the interest groups in the
financial sector which may facilitate the rent-seeking process.
Important is the fact that (1) interest groups in the financial sector
have relatively easy ways of getting organized, (2) that the
financially distorting regulations they seek are often justified by
referring to the negative outcomes of financial liberalization, and
(3) that financially distorting policies are usually the result of mixed
strategies.
1. Low Costs in Organization
First, it may be argued that the beneficiaries of FDP may
organize themselves more easily and more effectively and therefore
exert more influence on legislators and bureaucrats than their rivals,
the victims of financial distortions. Usually the beneficiaries of
FDP are small groups, such as banks and certain industries or
enterprises, whereas the victims are large groups, such as depositors
and minority shareholders. For example, as a result of interest rate
controls, depositors (particularly household sector) will be hurt
because their interest earnings will be less than they would have
been in a liberal financial environment, whereas enterprises will
benefit from such a repressive policy as the cost of credit is
artificially lowered.60
59 Id.
60 Certainly, not all enterprises can benefit from such a policy because interest rate
controls are usually accompanied by credit rationing, which means that certain enterprises
may be crowded out of the formal credit markets. Similarly, other financial regulations
may benefit certain enterprises at the cost of other enterprises (such as currency
devaluation, which may benefit export enterprises but hurt import enterprises); or certain
policies that benefit certain financial institutions at the cost of other financial institutions
like the role of Regulation Q in the process of financial development in the United States.
See R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and Why It Passed Away,
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As Olson argued decades ago, because the collective action
problem inherent in pursuing common objectives is more severe for
large groups than for small groups, "small groups will further their
common interests better than large groups."6 1  The empirical
evidence confirms Olson's conclusion by showing that even in the
United States, a country that has a highly developed democracy and
a well-functioning checks-and-balance system, small groups,
particularly economic elites and business interests, rather than the
interests of the general public, dominate the policy-making
process.6 2 Business and trade associations make up more than half
of the Washington lobbying community, accounting for 65% of the
registrations, 69% of the reports filed, and 70% of the issues
mentioned, and spending over nine times more money on lobbying
than citizen groups and nonprofits.63 It was also found that business
interests participate in the "notice and comment" procedures
(through which federal agencies can solicit and take into account
the views of concerned citizens prior to the promulgation of most
final agency rules) more vigorously and therefore are able to shift
agency rules toward their desired level of government regulation.64
In a 2014 study, Gilens and Page show that both individual
economic elites (proxied by Americans at the ninetieth income
percentile) and powerful interest groups (including those groups
that appear over the years in Fortune magazine's "Power 25" lists
and ten key industries that have reported the highest lobbying
expenditure) play a substantial part in affecting public policy,
whereas the general public (proxied by citizens at the fiftieth income
percentile) has little or no independent influence.' It is therefore
not surprising to find that financial policies are considerably
responsive to the pressure from powerful interest groups, such as
FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REv. 22 (1986); see also FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE
ECONONCs OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS (7th ed. 2004).
61 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 52 (1965).
6 2 Id
63 Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L. Leech, Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons:
Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics, 63 J. POL. 1191, 1196-97
(2001).
64 Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias TowardBusiness? Assessing
Interest Group Influence on the U.SBureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 128-130 (2006).
65 Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories ofAmerican Politics: Elites,
Interest Groups, andAverage Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 565 (2014).
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2. Financial Liberalization
Second, it is easy to justify certain financial regulations that may
lead to distortions, given the seemingly close connection between
financial liberalization and economic crisis. Financial liberalization
has been characterized as "the process of giving the market the
authority to determine who gets and grants credit and at what price,"
and full liberalization involves
the government's also allowing entry into the financial-
services industry to any company that can satisfy
objectively specified criteria based on prudential
considerations (concerning capital, skills, and reputation),
giving banks the autonomy to run their own affairs,
withdrawal from the ownership of financial institutions,
and abandoning control over international capital
movements.67
This characterization suggests six dimensions of financial
liberalization: (1) the elimination of credit controls; (2) the
deregulation of interest rates; (3) free entry into the banking sector
or, more generally, the financial-services industry; (4) bank
autonomy; (5) private ownership of banks; and (6) the liberalization
of international capital flows.68 In general, financial liberalization
means a process of partially or wholly removing FDP.9
Unfortunately, financial liberalization may lead to both
financial development and financial crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart
examined the relationship between banking crises and financial
liberalization.70  They report that in eighteen of the twenty-six
66 Charles L. Weise, Private Sector Influences on Monetary Policy in the United
States, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 449 (2008) (examining "the extent to which the
Federal Reserve's monetary policy actions are correlated with the expressed wishes of
private sector lobbying groups"); Avi Ben-Bassat, Conflicts, Interest Groups, andPolitics
in Structural Reforms, 54 J. L. & EcoN. 937 (2011) (finding "the greater extent ofconflicts
among regulations and the greater the intensity of the opposition of interest groups, the
lower the probability that a reform will be approved").
67 See John Williamson & Molly Mahar, A Survey ofFinancial Liberalization, 211
ESSAYS IN INT'L FIN. 1, 2 (1998).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 11-31.
70 See Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, The Twin Crises: The Causes
ofBanking and Balance-of-Payments Problems, 89 AM. EcoN. REv. 473 (1999).
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banking crises that they studied, the financial sector had been
liberalized during the preceding five years.7 1 A similar association
between financial liberalization and financial crisis is further
confirmed in other studies as well.72 However, recent studies find
that the relationship between financial liberalization and financial
crisis is more complicated.7
Although the empirical evidence concerning the relationship
between financial liberalization and economic crisis is therefore
mixed, beneficiaries of FDP may use a selection of the studies to
defend their positions. More particularly, they could argue that
serious financial crises could be avoided by certain distorted
financial policies, although economic efficiency may be sacrificed.
In other words, interest groups may argue that financial
liberalization should be avoided to prevent financial crises even
though, as mentioned, the empirical evidence that financial
liberalization would cause economic crisis is weak at best. For
example, this could lead to pleas for the creation of entry barriers,
notwithstanding their efficiency-damaging effects.74  Barriers to
market entry would help, so the interest groups would argue, to
stabilize the financial sector. They can receive some support from
studies showing that competition in financial markets may increase
71 Id. at 474.
72 See Williamson & Mahar, supra note 67; Ash Demirguc-Kunt & Enrica
Detragiache, Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility (IMF Working Paper,
WP/98/83 1998); Ash Demirguc-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, The Determinants of
Banking Crises in Developing andDeveloped Countries, 45(1) IMF STAFF PAPERS 81-109
(1998); Aaron Tornell, Frank Westermann & Lorenza Martinez, Liberalization, Growth,
and Financial Crises: Lessons from Mexico and the Developing World, 34 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON EcONOMIC ACTIVITY 1 (2003).
73 Romain Rancibre, Aaron Tomell & Frank Westermann, Decomposing the Effects
of Financial Liberalization: Crises vs. Growth, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 3331 (2006);
Graciela L. Kaminsky & Sergio L. Schmukler, Short-Run Pain, Long-Run Gain: Financial
Liberalization and Stock Market Cycles, 12 REV. FIN. 253 (2008); Apanard Angkinand,
Wanvimol Sawangngoenyuang & Clas Wihlborg, Financial Liberalization and Banking
Crises: A Cross-Country Analysis, 10 INT'L REV. FIN. 263 (2010); Christopher A.
Hartwell, If You're Going Through Hell, Keep Going: Nonlinear Effects of Financial
Liberalization in Transition Economies, 53 EMERGING MARKETS FIN. & TRADE 250
(2017); Helmi Hamdi & Nabila Boukef Jlassi, Financial Liberalization, Disaggregated
Capital Flows and Banking Crisis: Evidence from Developing Countries, 41 EcON.
MODELLING 124 (2014); Choudhry Tanveer Shehzad & Jakob De Haan, Financial Reform
andBanking Crises (CESifo Working Paper, No. 2870 2009).
74 See BARTH, CAPRIo & LEVINE, supra note 9; Berger et al., supra note 13, at 439,
445.
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the moral hazard problem of banks by eroding bank profits, which
in turn undermines bank franchise values (the capitalized value of
expected future profits) and induces banks to gamble on more risky
projects.75 These types of arguments would therefore be used by
interest groups to restrict competition via the creation of entry
barriers which de facto only lead to further financial distortions.
3. Mixes of Distortions
Third, one distortion may be intertwined with another, and the
package of FDP is therefore hard to be reformed in a piecemeal
manner. For example, Prasad shows that China's interest rate policy
has been severely weakened by the undervalued currency strategy.7 6
More specifically, as a result of China's undervaluation of its
currency, the volume of export continually increases, capital
inflows steadily grow, and a dramatic accumulation of foreign
exchange reserves has been observed.   In general, whereas
undervaluation may promote economic growth in the short or
medium term, maintaining this policy for too long will have
significant adverse consequences, such as an excessive
accumulation of low-yielding foreign reserves and high and
destabilizing liquidity growth and inflation.7 8  To sterilize the
liquidity generated by this growth pattern (and to address the
corresponding inflation problem), the central bank has to set interest
rates administratively at very low levels so that its sterilization costs
can be minimized and the speculative capital inflows can be
discouraged.7 9 Distorted interest rates will in turn lead to other
inefficiencies, such as credit discrimination and the rise of a shadow
banking system.o The dilemma is that reforming the whole package
of FDP may be politically difficult and technically complicated, but
only focusing on one dimension of FDP and leaving other
75 Thomas F. Hellmann, Kevin C. Murdock & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Liberalization,
Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements
Enough?, 90 AM. EcoN. REv. 147 (2000).
76 Eswar S. Prasad, Is the Chinese Growth Miracle Built to Last?, 20 CHNAEcON.
Rnv. 103,110-14 (2009).
77 Id. at 104,114.
78 Mona Haddad & Cosimo Pancaro, Can Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation Boost
Exports and Growth in Developing Countries? Yes, But Notfor Long, 20 EcoN. PREMISE
1,2(2010).
79 Prasad, supra note 76, at 112-15.
80 Id at 114.
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dimensions intact may not bring about significant efficiency
improvements.
D. Summary
In summary, interest groups may be attracted by rents associated
with FDP and therefore devote resources to influence both policy
design (by colluding with politicians) and policy implementation
(by corrupting regulators) so that FDP will be adopted and
maintained. FDP benefits special interest groups at the cost of
economic efficiency and social welfare; however, reforming or
abolishing FDP turns out to be difficult because interest groups
usually enjoy organizational advantages, financial liberalization is
risky, and financial distortion may be intertwined with one another.
HI. The Supply of Financially Distorting Regulation
What we have just discussed, i.e., the role of interest groups in
shaping FDP, is only a part of the story. On the "market" of
financial laws and regulations, interest groups act like consumers,
whose demands certainly influence the production of certain
institutional products, such as legislations, judgments, and
regulatory sanctions. However, these institutional products will not
emerge just because they are demanded. Rather, they need to be
supplied. We therefore need to examine the role of another
important player in the political arena, the government, which is
supposed to be the exclusive supplier of law and order in the modern
world." Why would politicians supply financially distorting
regulations?
We first argue that whereas private actors are rent-seeking,
politicians are engaged in rent-extraction (A); the extent to which
si However, it is worth noting that, worldwide, properly functioning governments
that supply public goods such as law and order are the exception, not the rule. Peter T.
Leeson, Better OffStateless: Somalia Before andAfter Government Collapse, 35 J. COMP.
EcN. 689, 691, 705 (2007); Peter T. Leeson & Claudia R. Williamson, Anarchy and
Development: An Application of the Theory of Second Best, 2 L. & DEv. REv. 76 (2009).
Even in developed countries with well-functioning governments, private supply of law and
order is not uncommon. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). In some extreme cases in which the government does not enforce
laws effectively, individuals will seek out an alternative order maintainer, such as
organized crime in Japan and Sicily. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side
of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67
UNiv. CH. L. REv. 41, 41 (2000); DIEGo GAMBETTA, THE SICILIAN MAFIA: THE BUSINESS
OF PRIVATE PROTECTION (1993).
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politicians are able to extract rents depends strongly on the
institutional environment (B). Especially in non-democratic
regimes authoritarian leaders may use financially distorting
regulations for rent-extraction (C). Summarizing, politicians
provide rents to private interest groups in exchange for political
support by these groups, necessary for the survival of the politicians
(D).
A. Rent-Extraction and Corruption
As McChesney argued forty years ago, politicians who control
the government should not be viewed "as mere brokers
redistributing wealth in response to competing private demands."
82
Rather, they are "independent actors making their own demands to
which private actors respond."8 These politicians may gain by, for
example, threatening to impose burdensome regulations on private
actors, who therefore have an incentive to strike bargains with these
politicians.8 The result is that regulations are repealed or only
enforced in a moderate manner, and politicians are paid for their
forbearing from exercising their power to impose costs." In other
words, whereas private actors are interested in rent-seeking,
politicians are good at rent-extracting.86  McChesney's rent-
extraction theory is further developed by Shleifer and Vishny, who
view the governmental intervention in markets as a "grabbing hand"
that satisfies the personal interests of politicians rather than a
"helping hand" that maximizes social welfare." Similarly, a recent
study has shown that excessive regulation, red tape, and
bureaucracy are used strategically by incumbent politicians to
induce incumbent firms to invest in political connections." In the
context of the financial sector, rent-extracting means that politicians
who control the government may actively create FDP to extract
82 Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory
ofRegulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 102 (1987).
8 3 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 30.
86 See id.
87 ANDREI SHLEFER & ROBERT W. VisHNY, THE GRABBING HAND: GOVERNMENT
PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CREs 3, 6 (1998).
88 Giorgio Bellettini, Carlotta Berti Ceroni & Giovanni Prarolo, Knowing the Right
Person in the Right Place: Political Connections and Resistance to Change, 12 J. EUR.
EcoN. Ass'N 641, 641-42 (2014).
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rents from private actors, such as banks, and then use these rents to
enrich themselves or to buy support from certain constituents who
are critical to their survival.
It is therefore not surprising to find that empirically, there is a
positive connection between government intervention (including
but not limited to financial regulation) and corruption.8 9 Corruption
is defined as "sale by government officials of government property
for personal gain" 9 0 or "acts in which the power of public office is
used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the
game,"9 and is therefore basically interchangeable with the term of
"rent extraction." In a more subtle way, corruption may be further
divided into two categories, namely political corruption and
bureaucratic corruption.92 Political corruption refers to the
phenomenon that "corrupt political leaders make resource
allocation decisions through national policies that serve their own
power-preservation goals rather than the interests of their
constituents," whereas bureaucratic corruption "occurs when
officials take advantage of their professional privilege to receive
unsanctioned compensation for performing their job-related duties
or for extending additional, extralegal benefits to a payer."93
There are indeed many empirical studies pointing at a
relationship between (financial) regulation by government and
corruption. For example, Treisman measured state intervention by
89 In the empirical literature, scholars usually use "perceived corruption," which is
based on assessments by risk agencies and surveys carried out among elite business people,
rather than "experienced corruption," which is based on surveys that ask business people
and citizens in different countries whether they have been expected to pay bribes recently.
This method is therefore criticized for its subjectivity. See Daniel Treisman, What Have
We LearnedAbout the Causes of Corruptionfrom Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical
Research?, 10 ANN. REV. POL. Sc. 211, 237 (2007); Benjamin A. Olken, Corruption
Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality, 93 J. PUB. EcoN. 950 (2009).
90 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. EcON. 599,599 (1993).
91 Arvind K. Jain, Corruption: A Review, 15 J. EcoN. SURv. 71, 73 (2001).
92 For a more detailed discussion on the definition, nature, and forms of corruption,
see JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, THE INSTITUTIONAL EcONoMICs OF CORRUPTION AND
REFORM: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY (2007).
93 Marina Zaloznaya, Does Authoritarianism Breed Corruption? Reconsidering the
Relationship Between Authoritarian Governance and Corrupt Exchanges in
Bureaucracies, 40 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 345, 348 (2015); see also Benjamin Nyblade &
Steven R. Reed, Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition and Corruption in Japan,
1947-1993, 52 AM. J. POL. SC. 926, 927 (2008); Hanne Fjelde & HAvard Hegre, Political
Corruption andInstitutional Stability, 49 STUD. IN COMP. INT'L DEv. 267, 267 (2014).
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a variable from the Institute for Management Development's World
Competitiveness Report, which records the responses of a survey of
executives in top and middle management to the following
statement: "State interference does not hinder the development of
business in your country."9 4 He found that state intervention tends
to increase corruption.9 5 Other studies find that there is a positive
correlation between entry regulation (measured by the number of
procedures required for starting a new business for a cross section
of eighty-five countries, along with the necessary time and official
costs) and corruption.9 6 This conclusion is further confirmed by
more recent studies.9
Certainly, rents can be extracted not only by politicians who
enact certain regulations that hurt private enterprises but also by
bureaucrats who are responsible for rule enforcement and enrich
themselves by selectively implementing these regulations. One
study uses a sample of forty-two countries to examine bureaucratic
rents (measured by the relative difference in reported life
satisfaction between public and private employees).98 They find
that bureaucratic rents are lower when economic regulations are less
suffocating (when it is easier to start a business and when price
controls are less widespread).99 They also focus on corruption,
which is measured by the perceptions of business executives
concerning the frequency of irregular, additional payments
connected with import and export permits, business licenses,
exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loan
applications.1 0 They find that bureaucratic rents are higher when
94 Daniel Treisman, The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study, 76 J. PUB.
ECON. 399, 399 (2000).
95 Id. at 436.
96 Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation ofEntry, 117 Q. J. EcoN. 1, 4 (2002); Jakob
Svensson, Eight Questions about Corruption, 19 J. EcoN. PERSP. 19, 34 (2005).
97 Luca Pieroni & Giorgio d'Agostino, Corruption and the Effects of Economic
Freedom, 29 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 54, 55 (2013); Nicholas A. Lash & Bala Batavia,
Government Economic Intervention and Corruption, 47 J. DEv. AREAS 1, 12 (2013);
Randall G. Holcombe & Christopher J. Boudreaux, Regulation and Corruption, 164 PUB.
CHOICE 75, 76-77 (2015).
98 Simon Luechinger, Stephan Meier & Alois Stutzer, Bureaucratic Rents and Life
Satisfaction, 24 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 476, 481 (2007).
99 Id. at 479.
100 Id. at 486.
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bureaucratic corruption is more prevalent.101 An important element
of the effects of regulatory policy on the level of corruption is the
discretion that bureaucrats have in law enforcement. Duvanova
examined the relationship between bureaucratic discretion and
corruption.102 The bureaucratic discretion was measured in this
study by using the Global Integrity country-level ranking of the
effectiveness of supreme audit institutions.1 0 3 The study found that
when bureaucratic discretion is low, regulatory burden has a
significant negative effect on freedom from corruption, whereas
when bureaucratic discretion is high, regulatory burden has no
effect on corruption.'0 4 A later study confirmed these results,
showing that the regulatory implementation (in other words the de
facto regulatory climate) rather than the regulatory policy as such
(de jure regulatory regime) is responsible for corruption.10 In the
financial sector, bank regulation and supervision are also found to
be associated with corruption in bank lending.106
Certainly, a positive connection between government
intervention (regulation) and corruption does not necessarily mean
that government intervention causes corruption. It is reasonable to
argue that private actors may use corruption to induce politicians to
design certain rules that favor these actors at the cost of social
welfare and economic efficiency. Therefore, "a vicious circle can
exist whereby inefficient regulation leads to corruption, which in
turn cultivates the further spread of troublesome regulation so as to
1o Id. at 480.
102 Dinissa Duvanova, Bureaucratic Discretion and the Regulatory Burden: Business
Environments under Alternative Regulatory Regimes, 42 BRrr. J. POL. Sci. 573, 573
(2012).
103 Id. at 588.
104 See id. at 573.
105 Dinissa Duvanova, Economic Regulations, Red Tape, and Bureaucratic
Corruption in Post-Communist Economies, 59 WoRLD DEv. 298, 307 (2014). In this
study, regulatory implementation is operationalized with the survey question about the
percentage of senior management's time per year spent dealing with business regulation,
corruption is operationalized in terms of the percentage of firms' revenues paid
unofficially to public officials, and regulatory policy is operationalized in terms of the
official number of regulatory procedures required to open a new business as reported by
the World Bank Doing Business reports (2003-2006).
106 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgilg-Kunt & Ross Levine, Bank Supervision and
Corruption in Lending, 53(8) J. MONETARY EcoN. 2131, 2156-57 (2006); James R. Barth
et al., Corruption in Bank Lending to Firms: Cross-country Micro Evidence on the
BeneficialRole ofCompetition andInformation Sharing, 91 J. FN.EcON. 361, 361 (2009).
2020 733
enhance administrative power and the opportunity to extract further
payoffs."o7
B. Importance of the Institutional Environment
To what extent politicians and/or bureaucrats can extract rents
from the private sector is dependent on the institutional
environments that define the incentives faced by these public
officials. In a highly developed democracy, where politicians are
constrained by the principle of checks and balances and punished
by voters for wrongdoings, it is more difficult for politicians to
extract rents. This has been shown both theoretically and
empirically in various studies. Theoretically Congleton,'
8 and
Grossman and Helpman'09 have shown that politicians in
democracies face a trade-off between positions that maximize rents
and positions that serve the general interest. Empirically, Mian,
Sufi, and Trebbino find that politicians' voting choice in U.S.
legislation is influenced by both constituent interests and campaign
contribution, and Dorsch"' shows that legislators are punished by
voters for their behavior of favoring special interests. Empirical
evidence equally shows that in democracies, particularly countries
with parliamentary systems or with relatively low levels of
democracy, incumbent politicians are more likely to be defeated
when the perceived level of corruption has increased.
1 12 However,
it is worth noting that whereas democracy helps to tie the grabbing
hands of politicians, it is also conducive to the development of
interest groups.113 This development of interest groups is harmful
for economic growth.' 14
107 LAMBSDORFF, supra note 92, at 60.
108 Roger D. Congleton, Campaign Finances andPolitical Platforms: the Economics
ofPolitical Controversy, 62 PUBLIC CHOICE 101, 114-16 (1989).
109 Gene M. Grossman & Ehanan Helpman, Electoral Competition and Special
Interest Politics, 63 RE. EcoN. STUD. 265, 283-84 (1996).
110 Mian, Sufi & Trebbi, supra note 29.
iii Dorsch, supra note 31.
112 Stefan Krause & Fabio Mendez, Corruption and Elections: An Empirical Study
for a Cross-Section of Countries, 21 EcoN. & POL. 179, 195-96 (2009).
113 Dennis Coates, Jac C. Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, Determinants of Interest
Group Formation, 133 PUB. CHOICE 377, 386 (2007).
114 Dennis Coates, Jac C. Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, The Political Economy of
Investment: Sclerotic Effectsfrom Interest Groups, 26 EUR. J. POL. EcoN. 208, 208 (2010);
Dennis Coates, Jac C. Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, Special-Interest Groups and Growth,
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Several studies have therefore, not surprisingly, found that
democracy can lower rent extraction (corruption). Emerson reports
that more political rights and participation (measured by civil
liberties such as the freedom of the press, of religion, and of
assembly, political organization, the independence of the judiciary,
secure property rights, etc.) have a depressing effect on
corruption. 15 Firms also pay bribes with less frequency in countries
with better political rights and more developed democracies."'
Democracy is found to have a negative and significant effect on
bureaucratic corruption (referring to private payments to public
officials to affect the implementation of already existing rules).1 1 7
In addition to the level of democracy, other studies report the
importance of duration of democracy. For example, Treisman
reports that the long period of exposure to democracy (rather than
the current degree of democracy in a country) is significant to the
lowering of corruption." One study reports that both democracy
(whether democratically contested elections are held in a country)
and democratic stability (time of an uninterrupted democratic
regime since 1930 in a country) are associated with lower
corruption.' 19Another shows that "long-term democratic rule tends
to lead to lower levels of political corruption across the world."
Parliamentary democracies and countries with long-standing
democratic governments tend to have less corruption.121 Finally, the
process for democratization (the transformation from autocracies to
democracies) is generally found to be correlated with a reduction in
corruption levels.122
147 PUB. CHOICE 439, 452 (2011).
115 Patrick M. Emerson, Corruption, Competition and Democracy, 81 J. DE. ECON.
193, 211 (2006).
116 Sanford V. Berg, Liangliang Jiang & Chen Lin, Regulation and Corporate
Corruption: New Evidencefrom the Telecom Sector, 40 J. CMP. EcoN. 22, 32 (2012).
117 Tanya Bagashka, Unpacking Corruption: The Effect of Veto Players on State
Capture and Bureaucratic Corruption, 67 POL. REs. Q. 165,176 (2014).
us Treisman, supra note 89.
119 Daniel Lederman, Norman V. Loayza & Rodrigo R. Soares, Accountability and
Corruption: Political Institution Matter, 17 EcoN. & POL. 1, 1 (2003).
120 John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role
of Unitarism andParliamentarism, 34 BRrT. J.POL. Sci. 295, 310 (2004).
121 Randall G. Holcombe & Christopher J. Boudreaux, Regulation and Corruption,
164 PUB. CHOICE 75, 81 (2015).
122 Anders Olofsghrd & Zaki Zahran, Corruption and Political and Economic
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Certain studies find that the connection between democracy and
corruption may be non-linear. For example, Montinola and
Jackman report that democracy has a nonlinear effect on corruption:
corruption is likely to be slightly lower in dictatorships than in
countries that have partially democratized.123  But with more
complete democratization (reflected in the nature of elections and
the effective power of elected legislators), countries experience
much lower levels of corruption.12 This conclusion is further
supported by other studies.12 5
In a similar vein, and again not surprisingly, less distorting,
more liberal, and more market-oriented policies are more likely to
be found in democracies. For example, de Haan and Sturm find that
increases in economic freedom between 1975 and 1990 in
developing countries can be explained by the level of democracy in
these countries in 1975.126 This conclusion is supported by
numerous subsequent empirical studies.12 7 However, there are
Reforms: A Structural Breaks Approach, 20 EcoN. & POL. 156, 156 (2008).
123 Gabriella R. Montinola & Robert W. Jackman, Sources of Corruption: A Cross-
Country Study, 32 BRrr. J. POL. Sci. 147, 167 (2002).
124 Id.
125 See Michael T. Rock, Corruption andDemocracy, 45 J. DEv. STuD. 55-75 (2009);
Alessandro Pellegata, Constraining Political Corruption: An Empirical Analysis of the
Impact ofDemocracy, 20 DEMOCRATIZATION 1195 (2013), and Michael Jetter, Alejandra
Montoya Agudelo & Andrds Ramirez Hassan, The Effect of Democracy on Corruption:
Income is Key, 74 WORLD DEV. 286 (2015).
126 Jakob de Haan & Jan-Egbert Sturm, Does More Democracy Lead to Greater
Economic Freedom? New Evidencefor Developing Countries, 19 EUR. J. POL. EcoN. 547,
549-50(2003).
127 See Jan Fidrmuc, Economic Reform, Democracy and Growth during Post-
communist Transition, 19 EUR. J. POL. EcoN. 583 (2003); Hans Pitlik & Steffen Wirth, Do
Crises Promote the Extent of Economic Liberalization?: An Empirical Test, 19 EUR. J.
POL. EcoN. 565 (2003); Francesco Giavazzi & Guido Tabellini, Economic and Political
Liberalizations, 52 J. MONETARY EcoN. 1297 (2005); Susanna Lundstram, The Effect of
Democracy on Diferent Categories ofEconomic Freedom, 21 EUR. J. POL. EcON. 967-80
(2005); Xavier de Vanssay, Vincent Hildebrand & Zane A. Spindler, Constitutional
Foundations of Economic Freedom: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis, 16 CONST.
POL. EcoN. 327 (2005); Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Democracy andDevelopment:
The Devil in the Details, 96 AM. ECON. REv. 319 (2006); Robert A. Lawson & J.R. Clark,
Examining the Hayek-Friedman Hypothesis on Economic and Political Freedom, 74 J.
EcoN. BEHA. & ORG. 230 (2010); Pauline Grosjean & Claudia Senik, Democracy, Market
Liberalization andPoliticalPreferences, 93 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 365 (2011); John Gerring
et al., Democracy, History, and Economic Performance: A Case-Study Approach, 39
WORLD DEv. 1735 (2011); Paola Giuliano, Prachi Mishra & Antonio Spilimbergo,
Democracy and Reforms: Evidence from a New Dataset, 5 AM. EcON. J.:
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certain disagreements regarding the democracy-economic
liberalization nexus. One particular study finds little difference
between democracies and non-democracies concerning economic
and social policies (such as education spending, social spending,
and tax policy), whereas there are indeed differences between
democracies and non-democracies in the areas related to political
rights (such as practice of torture, use of death penalty, civil
liberties, etc.).128 Others even report that a transition from autocracy
to democracy is accompanied by the adoption of anti-liberal policies
(agricultural protection).129
Certain other studies show that the relationship between
democracy and economic freedom is more complicated than
suggested by the literature that we have just discussed. One study
finds that democratic transition does result in a positive and highly
significant impact on economic freedom.1 o However, the path of
economic liberalization appears to follow the pattern of an inverted
U: there is a significant increase in economic freedom five years
after the transition to democracy, and the movement toward
liberalization continues through year ten, but economic freedom
begins to recede thereafter."' In addition, the effect of democracy
on economic freedom seems to be conditional on the income
distribution within a society: the positive effect of democracy on
economic freedom is reinforced by an equal distribution of incomes,
whereas the effect is eroded if inequality becomes too high.3 2
Because most of the studies confirming the democracy-
economic liberalization nexus use the Economic Freedom of the
World summary index'3 3 as a proxy for economic freedom
MACROECONOMICS 179 (2013); Mohammad Amin & Simeon Djankov, Democratic
Institutions andRegulatory Reforms, 42 J. COMP. EcON. 839 (2014).
128 Casey B. Mulligan, Richard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Do Democracies Have
Diferent Public Policies than Nondemocracies?, 18 J. EcoN. PERSP. 51, 71-72 (2004).
129 Alessandro Olper & Valentina Raimondi, Electoral Rules, Forms of Government
and Redistributive Policy: Evidence from Agriculture and Food Policies, 41 J. COMP.
EcoN. 141, 141-42 (2013).
130 Martin Rode & James D. Gwartney, Does Democratization Facilitate Economic
Liberalization?, 28 EuR. J. POL. EcoN. 607, 607 (2012).
13 1 Id. at 6 15 .
132 Rainer Kotschy & Uwe Sunde, Democracy, Inequality, andInstitutional Quality,
91 EuR. EcoN. REv. 209, 210 (2017).
133 For examples of other indexes, such as the progress-in-transition indicators
published by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, see Fidrmuc, supra
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(liberalization)134 and two components of this index, i.e., "sound
money" and "regulation of credit, labor, and business" measure the
extent of governmental intervention in the financial sector, the
conclusion of these studies implies that democracies not only have
free economic policies in general but also have more liberalized
financial policies in particular. Certain other studies focus more
specifically on the relationship between democracy and financial
liberalization (rather than with general economic policies) and
further confirm the positive effects of democracy on financial
liberalization. One particular study concludes that "more open,
competitive, democratic political systems tend to choose bank
supervisory and regulatory strategies that rely more on private
monitoring, accept a higher fraction of new bank entry applications,
impose fewer regulatory restrictions on what banks can do, and have
less of a role for government-owned banks.""' Another finds that
at low levels of democracy, moves to left governments tend to
significantly decrease chances of financial liberalization, whereas
in more democratic settings, this negative effect of left
representation disappears. In other words, democratization
significantly mutes the tendency of left governments to oppose
financialliberalization.1 36
In contrast, in non-democratic regimes, politicians have both
capabilities and incentives to design and implement inefficient
economic and financial policies to extract rents from the economy.
Politicians have capabilities because the institutional constraints on
political power that can be found in democracies are weak or even
absent, and politicians have incentives because rents will not only
enrich themselves but also, and more importantly, buy support from
certain constituents whose loyalty is critical for the survival of the
regime (or its ruler). In a non-democratic regime, such as an
autocracy, rulers resort to a divide-and-rule strategy to maintain
note 127; regulation indices compiled by the International Monetary Fund, see Paola
Giuliano, Prachi Mishra & Antonio Spilimbergo, Democracy andReforms: Evidencefrom
a New Dataset, 5 A. EcoN. J. MACROECONOMICS 179 (2013); and Doing Business
indicators compiled by the World Bank, see Mohammad Amin & Simeon Djankov,
Democratic Institutions and Regulatory Reforms, 42 J. CoMP. EcON. 839 (2014).
134 See James Gwartney, Robert Lawson & Joshua Hall, Economic Freedom of the
World, FRASER INST. (2017) (for the most recent version of this index).
13s BARTH, CAPRIo & LEVINE, supra note 9, at 306.
136 Brian Burgoon, Panicos Demetriades & Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, Sources and
Legitimacy ofFinancial Liberalization, 28 EUR. J. PL. EcoN. 147, 153 (2012).
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their rule: members of society need to cooperate to depose an
autocrat; however, such cooperation may be defused by punishing
any citizen who proposes such a move and bribing those who need
to agree to the cooperation.'37 Bribing in turn needs rents.
Even certain democracies (particularly younger democracies)
rely on rent distribution as a main governance strategy.1 3  But the
literature especially stresses the importance of rents in sustaining
non-democratic regimes. One study argues that "dictators typically
use two instruments to build and maintain political power over the
population under their governments. The first instrument involves
political repression . . .. Alternatively, dictators can bind parts of
the population to them as loyal supporters through the creation and
distribution of political rents."1 3 9 Another study similarly contends
that dictators usually deploy either of two instruments, repression or
economic redistribution, to maintain their rule.14 0 The survival
strategies of dictators have therefore been described as using some
combination of sticks and carrots in order to maintain power, where
"carrots, measures that build support or acceptance of the ruler,
range from the distribution of rents and patronage to programmatic
redistribution and broad-based economic growth. Sticks are
coercive or repressive measures that raise the costs of collective
action for opponents of the regime."141 The outcome of such
strategies is numerous opportunities that "impoverish many, distort
the economy, but enrich the privileged few."4 2 With the help of
economic rents, the political dominance of a narrow elite, who use
their concentrated political power to design extractive economic
institutions from the beginning, is further consolidated.143
137 DaronAcemoglu, JamesA. Robinson &Thierry Verdier,KleptocracyandDivide-
and Rule: A Model ofPersonalRule, 2 J. EUR. EcoN. ASS'N 162, 162 (2004).
138 Philip Keefer, Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young
Democracies, 51 AM. J.POL. Sci. 804, 812 (2007).
139 RONALD WINTROBE, THE POLITICAL EcoNoMY OF DICTATORSHIP 46 (1998).
140 Stephen Haber, Authoritarian Government, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 694 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds., 2006).
141 Mary Gallagher & Jonathan K. Hanson, Coalitions, Carrots, andSticks: Economic
Inequality and Authoritarian States, 42(4) POL. ScI. & POL. 668 (2009).
142 HILTON L. RooT, CAPITAL AND COLLUSION: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF GLOBAL
ECONOIC DEVELOPMENT 37 (2006).
143 See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF
POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012).
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C. Supply ofFinancially Distorting Regulation
Different policy tools are used by different non-democratic
regimes to buy support from different groups. In the former Soviet
economies, the main beneficiaries of economic (and political) rents
are members of communist parties and bureaucrats. For example,
the Soviet-style economy has been described as a rent-seeking
system, where rents are offered by the party-state in exchange for
loyalty of managers of state-owned enterprises ("SOEs") and
officials at every level. 1" It was also found that in the six former
Yugoslav republics in the 1953-1988 period, membership of the
League of Communists of Yugoslav is positively correlated with
unemployment and negatively with real wages, which implies the
rent-enjoying status of communist party members.1 4 5 There is equal
evidence that in the Soviet Union in the 1930s vehicles (cars and
trucks) were allocated by top-leaders to buy support from core
constituents.14 6 The rent-seeking in a Soviet-style regime has also
been modelled as an implicit contract between the rent-maximizing
rulers and rent-seeking activists (candidate members of the
communist party).147 According to this model, activists would be
induced to work hard (at the lowest rank of the hierarchy) today in
exchange for the prospect of promotion to a higher-paid (rent-
enjoying) position in the future.1 4 8 That model has been tested and
confirmed in a study by Lazarev who finds that the supply of
activists is positively affected by the size of the income gap between
the party bureaucracy and workers.14 9 Another author argues that
whereas rent-seeking could not govern the classical socialist
society, reduced coercion and loosening of control during
perestroika infused the system with rent-seeking and triggered the
144 Gary M. Anderson & Peter J. Boettke, Soviet Venality: A Rent-Seeking Model of
the Communist State, 93 PUB. CHOICE 37, 47 (1997).
145 See generally Adi Schnytzer & Janez ugtergi , Why Join the Party in a One-Party
System? Popularity Versus Political Exchange, 94 PUB. CHOICE 117 (1998) (finding "rents
distributed to the population were far more important than the popularity of economic
policies and perhaps even more important than repression").
146 Valery Lazarev & Paul Gregory, Commissars and Cars: A Case Study in the
Political Economy ofDictatorship, 31 J. COmP. EcON. 1, 17 (2003).
147 Valery Lazarev, Economics ofOne-Party State: PromotionIncentives and Support
for the Soviet Regime, 47 COMP. EcoN. STuD. 346, 349 (2005).
148 Id. at 361.
149 Valery Lazarev, Political Labor Market, Government Policy, and Stability of a
Non-Democratic Regime, 35 J. COMP. EcoN. 546, 546 (2007).
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collapse of the planned economy. 0
The situation in contemporary authoritarian regimes is more
diversified. The rulers in such regimes may rely on public
investment as a vehicle to enrich themselves or maintain power.
This is confirmed in a study by Keefer and Knack who report that
an increase in the quality of governance is associated with a
reduction in public investment, which implies that in countries
where governance is weak, "extra public investment . . . [is] largely
intended to steer rents to government officials or their cronies."'
It has also been shown that authoritarian dominant parties
continually win elections because they can access and use SOEs,
government investment, and other public resources to buy
support.1 52
Rulers in authoritarian regimes may also use rents to appease
the public by other means. For example, the availability of rents
(proxied by non-tax revenues) helps authoritarian governments to
expand welfare spending (health, education, housing,
unemployment benefits, pensions, and community amenities),
thereby realizing an "authoritarian bargain;" i.e., citizens relinquish
political rights in exchange for social welfare spending.' Rulers
could also provide more benefits to workers in exchange for low
levels of labor protest. There is indeed evidence that under
institutionalized authoritarian regimes (regimes with legislatures
and parties), workers take home more income than in non-
institutionalized authoritarian regimes; as a result, workers are
significantly less likely to strike in institutionalized authoritarian
regimes.'5 4 Authoritarian rulers may equally favor city dwellers at
the cost of rural farmers "because city dwellers are politically more
i5o Guinevere Liberty Nell, Rent-Seeking, Hierarchy and Centralization: Why the
Soviet Union Collapsed So Fast and What it Means for Market Economies, 53 CoMP.
EcoN.STUD.597,597(2011).
isi Philip Keefer& Stephen Knack, Boondoggles, Rent-Seeking, andPolitical Checks
and Balances: Public Investment under Unaccountable Governments, 89 REv. EcON. &
STAT. 566, 566 (2007).
152 Kenneth F. Greene, The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party
Dominance, 43 COMP. POL. STUD. 807, 807 (2010).
153 Raj M. Desai, Anders Olofsgrd & Tarik M. Yousef, The Logic ofAuthoritarian
Bargains, 21 EcoN. & POL. 93, 93 (2009).
154 Wonik Kim & Jennifer Gandhi, Coopting Workers under Dictatorship, 72 J. POL.
646, 646 (2010).
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powerful than rural farmers.""' They will also often co-opt
opposition elites so that their followers can be demobilized. For
example, in Russia "when opposition elites hold key leadership
position in a legislature, particularly those positions that are related
to opportunities for rent-seeking, such as chairmanship of
committees of construction, agriculture, economy, industry,
property, natural resources, ecology, land, or taxes, protest by
groups associated with those elites is reduced."S6 Finally,land
distribution can be used to generate political support. For example,
in Mexico from 1917 to 1992, land distribution was higher during
election years, and land distribution increased support to the
governing party (Institutional Revolutionary Party) in Mexican
states.1 17
Financial distortions are also used by authoritarian rulers to
maintain their power by extending credit to their supporters. For
example, during their fast growth period, certain Asian economies,
such as Korea and Taiwan, were under authoritarian rule.
Authoritarian governments in these economies intentionally
distorted the functioning of financial markets so that economic
growth could be boosted and therefore legitimacy could be realized.
In Amsden's words, in East Asian economies, "economic expansion
depends on state intervention to create price distortions that direct
economic activity toward greater investment," and in that sense, the
state "has set relative prices deliberately 'wrong.'"'1 8  More
importantly, "the most critical price-that for long-term credit-
was wildly 'wrong' in a capital-scarce country.' A similar
conclusion was reached by Wade, who argues that
government policies deliberately got some prices 'wrong', so as
to change the signals to which decentralized agents responded,
and also used non-price means to alter the behavior of market
agents. The resulting high level of investment generated fast
turnover of machinery and hence fast transfer of newer
155 Jeremy Wallace, Cities, Redistribution, and Authoritarian Regime Survival, 75 J.
POL. 632, 632 (2013).
156 Ora John Reuter & Graeme B. Robertson, Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social
Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes, 77 J. POL. 235, 235-36 (2015).
157 Michael Albertus et al., Authoritarian Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform
in Mexico, 77 WORLDDEV. 154, 154, 162 (2016).
158 ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE
INDUSTRIAZZATION 13-14 (1992).
1s9 Id. at 144.
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technology into actual production.16 0
Despite their growth-enhancing effects, such financial distortions
generate enormous economic inefficiency and finally contributed to
the eruption of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98.161
In addition, in such a policy environment, certain banks and
enterprises that are closely connected with politicians are also
favored. In Japan and Korea, Lukauskas finds that policy makers in
these two countries (particularly Korea) "use interest rate and credit
controls to channel available funds through a non-price-rationing
system to build support among important constituents. They impose
heavy reserve requirements, asset restrictions, and other forms of
taxation of the banking system to expropriate seigniorage from
financial intermediaries and raise government revenue." 62
A patronage-based credit allocation model can also be observed
in many other authoritarian regimes. For example, in Malaysia,
firms with political connections had debt ratios that were five
percentage points higher than unconnected firms.1 63  Similar
evidence on advantages of political connections also comes from
Pakistan. Using a loan-level data set of more than 90,000 firms in
Pakistan between 1996 and 2002, Khawja and Mian find that
compared with unconnected firms, politically connected firms
borrow 45% more and have 50% higher default rates, and such
preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks.164
In Indonesia, the Suharto regime often arranged preferential
financing for well-connected firms, who were therefore less
dependent on global financial markets (less likely to have publicly
traded securities abroad).16 5
Favoring politically connected firms does not only happen in
160 ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONoMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 29 (2d paperback ed. 2004).
161 See Stephan Haggard, Governance and Growth: Lessonsfrom the Asian Economic
Crisis, 13 ASIAN PAc. EcoN. LIT. 30, 33-38 (1999).
162 Arvid Lukauskas, Financial Restriction and the Developmental State in East Asia:
Toward a More Complex Political Economy, 35 COMP. POL. STUD. 379, 385 (2002).
163 Simon Johnson & Todd Mitton, Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from
Malaysia, 67 J. FIN. EcoN. 351, 364-65 (2003).
164 Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms?
Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market, 120 Q. J. EcoN. 1371, 1371 (2005).
165 Christian Leuz & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Political Relationships, Global
Financing, and Corporate Transparency: Evidencefrom Indonesia, 81 J. FIN. EcON. 411,
415, 436 (2006).
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authoritarian regimes. In democratically developing countries, such
as Brazil, bank loans are frequently allocated based on political
calculation. In Brazil, firms that provide contributions to (elected)
federal deputies substantially increase their bank lending (and
experienced higher stock returns) than firms that did not around the
1998 and 2002 elections.16 6 Also in Brazil, politicians used bank
lending to shift employment towards regions that were controlled
by their political allies and away from regions without allied
incumbents.1 6 More generally, Desai and Olofsgaird found that in
a sample of forty developing countries, politically connected firms
benefit from easier access to credit (and other favors, such as lower
administrative and regulatory barriers and greater pricing power).
These firms, in turn, provide politically valuable benefits to
incumbent politicians by maintaining excess labor and paying more
taxes.6
Even mature democracies have been shown to be susceptible to
this disease. In Italy, Sapienza "find[s] that the party affiliation of
state-owned banks' chairperson has a positive impact on the interest
rate discount given by state-owned banks in the provinces where the
associated party is stronger.""6 In the United States, it was reported
that the cost of bank loans was significantly lower for Standard &
Poors 500 companies that have board members with political ties.17 0
More generally, Ding shows that in a sample of 36 countries (19
emerging markets and 17 developed economies), government-
owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to
private banks.'
In addition to favorable access to financial resources, politically
connected firms are also found to be more likely to be bailed out
166 Stijn Claessens, Erik Feijen &Luc Laeven, Political Connections andPreferential
Access to Finance: The Role ofCampaign Contributions, 88 J. FIN. EcON. 554, 554 (2008).
167 Daniel Carvalho, The Real Effects of Government-Owned Banks: Evidencefrom
an Emerging Market, 69 J. FN. 577, 577 (2014).
168 Raj M. Desai & Anders Olofsgird, The Costs ofPolitical Influence: Firm-Level
Evidence From Developing Countries, 6 Q. J. POL. SCI. 137, 138 (2011).
169 Paola Sapienza, The Effects ofGovernment Ownership on Bank Lending, 72 J. FIN.
EcoN. 357, 380 (2004).
170 Joel F. Houston et al., Political Connections and the Cost ofBank Loans, 52 J.
ACCT. REs. 193, 193 (2014).
171 I. Serdar Ding, Politicians and Banks: PoliticalInfluences on Government-owned
Banks in Emerging Markets, 77 J. FN. EcoN. 453, 453 (2005).
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than their non-connected peers when facing financial distress.1 7 2
There are also studies that attempt to measure the importance of
political factors in allocation of financial resources by analyzing
stock market reactions to certain political events, which in general
confirm the politics-finance nexus.
In general, Calomiris and Haber conclude that "on average,
democracies are more likely to give rise to stable banking systems
characterized by relatively open entry and fewer restrictions on
banks, while autocracies are more likely to give rise to unstable
banking systems characterized by relatively limited entry and more
restrictions on banks." 74 Moreover, in authoritarian regimes,
a system that grants special licenses and privileges to favored
bank insiders and restricts entry as part of a larger deal between
bank insiders and the autocrat will generally arise. This deal
provides a constant flow of a portion of the rents to the
government, giving the autocrat a vested interest in the favored
banks and thereby reducing the risk of expropriation.'
Similarly, Barth, Caprio, and Levine conclude that their empirical
evidence is
consistent with the view that autocratic political regimes establish
government-owned banks to funnel credit toward the interest of
the ruling elite" and is "consistent with the view that closed
political systems that are unaccountable to the public at large will
tend to create regulatory restrictions so that bankers need to lobby
politicians for special exemptions."'
Financial distortions may benefit authoritarian rulers in the short
term but endanger their rule in the long-run because distorted
financial regulations and policies will inhibit financial
development, and slower financial development, as we have argued
at the beginning of this paper, will damage long-term economic
172 Mara Faccio, Ronald W. Masulis & John J. McConnell, Political Connections and
Corporate Bailouts, 61 J. FIN. 2597, 2597 (2006); see also Mian, Sufi & Trebbi, supra
note 29; Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, A Fisful ofDollars: Lobbying and
the Financial Crisis, 26 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN. 195, 230 (2012).
173 See Raymond Fisman, Estimating the Value of Political Connections, 91 AM.
EcON. REv. 1095, 1095-96 (2001); Mara Faccio, Politically Connected Firms, 96 AM.
EcON. RE. 369, 369 (2006).
174 CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN H. HABER, FRAGILE BY DESIGN: THE
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF BANKING CRISES AND SCARCE CREDIT 40 (2014).
175 Id. at 45.
176 BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 9, at 305.
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growth. Indeed, there is evidence showing that financial
development is easier to achieve in democracies77 rather than in
authoritarian regimes.
Bordo and Rousseau explore the relationship between financial
development and the political environment in a historical cross-
section of seventeen countries covering the period from 1880 to
1997 and find that "political variables such as proportional
representation election systems, frequent elections, and infrequent
revolutions or coups are consistent with larger financial sectors."78
Another study uses panel data on both developed and developing
countries from 1975 to 2000 to examine the effect of a country's
democracy characteristics and regime change on financial
development, and find that both regime stability and democracy
promote financial development.179 Huang employs a panel dataset
of ninety developed and developing countries over 1960-1999
showing that a democratic transformation is typically followed by
an increase in financial development.'
It should also be noted that certain studies show that the
connection between democracy and financial development is more
complicated than that suggested by previous literature. For
example, Quintyn and Verdier find that whether a financial
177 However, democratic countries are not homogeneous with respect to such factors
as distribution of power, social ideology, preference of median voters, etc. The differences
in these dimensions will further influence the direction, speed, and stability of financial
development. See Victor Menaldo & Daniel Yoo, Democracy, Elite Bias, and Financial
Development in Latin America, 67 WORLD POL. 726, 727 (2015) (finding "elite based
democracies," or those with constitutions inherited from prior authoritarianism, to be "less
financially developed" than popular democracies, or those with their own democratically
created or amended constitutions). Enrico C. Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The
Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents, 11 J. POL. EcON. 145, 147
(2006) (explaining the effect of median voters on financial development); MARK J. ROE,
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT,
CORPORATE IMPACT 1 (2003); Marianna Belloc & Ugo Pagano, Co-evolution of Politics
and Corporate Governance; 29 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 106, 106 (2009) (explaining the
effects of social ideology on financial development); Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin,
The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 95 AM. EcoN. REv. 1005, 1005 (2005)
(explaining the effect of electoral systems on financial development).
178 Michael D. Bordo &Peter L. Rousseau, Legal-Political Factors and the Historical
Evolution of the Finance-Growth Link, 10 EUR. REV. EcoN. HisT. 412, 440 (2006).
179 Sourafel Girma & Anja Shortland, The Political Economy of Financial
Development, 60 OXFORD EcoN. PAPERS 567, 567 (2007).
18o Yongfu Huang, Political Institutions and Financial Development: An Empirical
Study, 38 WORLDDEv. 1667, 1667 (2010).
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acceleration can finally lead to long-term financial deepening
depends on the quality of political institutions." Campos and
Coricelli show that there is a non-monotonic relationship between
democracy and financial development because the lowest level of
financial development tends to occur in intermediate regimes of
"partial democracy."8 2 Therefore, during the democratization
process, when the system travels from autocracy to partial
democracy, financial development is likely to go through reversals.
Similarly, Law and Azman-Saini report a non-linear relationship
between political institutions and stock market development.
D. Summary
In summary, rents created by FDP are crucial for politicians,
particularly politicians in non-democracies, where political
influence is concentrated. Support from certain politically
influential groups is critical for the survival of these politicians.
They therefore have strong incentives (and capabilities) to design
and implement certain inefficient financial policies, such as entry
barriers that benefit incumbent banks, cheap credit that benefits
certain enterprises with political connections, and targeted bank
loans that benefit certain regions where their core constituents are
located. Consequently, financial resource allocation is distorted,
economic efficiency is damaged, and the foundation of long-term
economic growth is undermined.
IV. The Interaction between Demand and Supply
The evidence seems to suggest that influence from the demand
side (interest groups) plays a more important role in shaping
distorted financial policies in democracies, and the government, as
the supplier of financial policies, should be blamed for being
responsible for financial distortions in non-democracies. It is not a
surprising conclusion, given that politicians are more constrained
and interest groups are more prevalent and active in democracies.184
181 Marc Quintyn & Genevieve Verdier, Mother, Can I Trust the Government?
Sustained Financial Deepening-A Political Institutions View 19 (IMF Working Paper,
WP/10/210 2010).
182 Nauro Campos & Fabrizio Coricelli, Financial Liberalization and Reversals:
Political andEconomic Determinants, 27 EcoN. POL'Y 483, 486, 508 (2012).
183 See Siong Hook Law & W.N.W. Azman-Saini, Institutional Quality, Governance,
andFinancialDevelopment, 13 EcON. GOVERNANCE 217, 217 (2012).
184 See Coates, Heckelman & Wilson, supra note 113, at 386 (discussing the
2020 747
However, it would be wrong to then argue that politicians are
completely passive in democracies and that interest groups play no
role in non-democracies. As the evidence shows, politicians in
democracies also intentionally and actively use financial resources
(such as bank loans) to reward their supporters. We provided
studies showing empirical evidence of that in the previous section.
Even in a developed democracy such as the United States, there are
claims that the political-economic system is "crony capitalism" in
which the "government protects and subsidizes powerful
corporations and in (implicit) exchange, the government uses those
businesses to carry out government policies outside of the ordinary
processes of government."185 Similarly, powerful interest groups,
particularly wealthy families, or economic oligarchies wield
significant clout in non-democratic regimes by colluding with or
even controlling politicians. For example, "in 2000, the Russian
oligarchs took over the Russian Union of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs (RSPP)."8 6 Since then, "RSPP's leaders have
regularly met with President Putin to discuss economic policy ...
[and] provided advice to the government and parliament on
legislative changes; on several occasions, RSPP even drafted and
put forward important pieces of legislation."1 The oligarchies in
Russia are so powerful that it is claimed that there is a "state
capture," which is defined as "the efforts of firms to shape the
formation of the basic rules of the game (i.e. laws, rules, decrees
and regulations) through illicit and non-transparent private
payments to public officials."' Similar evidence came from Korea
(before its democratization), where the industrial conglomerates
known as chaebol were so politically influential that Lukauskas
concludes that "selective credit policy was highly politicized and it
was no longer possible to specify whether the chaebol or the
government actually controlled Korea's credit allocation policy."
89
connection between political systems and interest group formation).
185 Todd Zywicki, Rent-Seeking, Crony Capitalism, and the Crony Constitution, 23
SUP. CT.EcON. REv. 77, 77 (2015).
186 Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky, The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism,
19 J. EcoN.PERsP. 131, 145 (2005).
187 Id.
188 Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones & Daniel Kaufmann, Seize the State, Seize the Day:
State Capture andInfluence in Transition Economies, 31 J. CmP. EcON. 751, 756 (2003).
189 Lukauskas, supra note 162, at 396.
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Both political and economic elites in Korea are powerful enough to
harm the other, which leads to a "mutual hostage situation."90
Across the world, wealthy families' control over large corporations
and banks seems to be a prevalent phenomenon."' Such a control,
unfortunately, leads to significant economic inefficiency, social
injustice, and political irresponsibility.192
Therefore, it is safer to conclude that both demand and supply
factors matter for understanding the existence and continuance of
FDP and that which factor dominates depends on the institutional
context within which demand and supply factors function, such as
the constitutional framework of a country; the political
accountability, responsibility, and responsiveness of a government;
and the relationship among government, business, society, etc.
Moreover, demand and supply factors may influence, complement,
and reinforce each other, and such complementarity may further
lead to multiple equilibria, i.e., rent-seeking by interest groups and
rent extraction by politicians are constrained in certain
environments, whereas interest groups and politicians are
unscrupulous in other environments.'
190 David C. Kang, Transaction Costs and Crony Capitalism in East Asia, 35 CoMP.
POL. 439, 442 (2003).
191 Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon & Bernard Yeung, Corporate Governance,
Economic Entrenchment, and Growth, 43 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 3 655, 657-60 (2005)
(discussing the ubiquity with which a relatively small number of families control the
corporate sectors in most of the world's economies); Gerard Caprio, Luc Laeven & Ross
Levine, Governance and Bank Valuation, 16 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 584, 595 (2007)
(pointing out that in the average country, a single family is the controlling owner in 52%
of banks with a controlling owner); Randall Morck, M. Deniz Yavuz & Bernard Yeung,
Banking System Control, Capital Allocation, andEconomy Performance, 100 J.FIN.ECON.
264, 265 (2011) (discussing performance based on family control of banking institutions).
192 Kathy Fogel, Oligarchic Family Control, Social Economic Outcomes, and the
Quality of Government, 37 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 603, 617 (2006).
193 See Joel S. Hellman & Mark Schankerman, Intervention, Corruption and Capture:
The Nexus Between Enterprises and the State, 8 EcoN. TRANSITION 545 (2000) (reporting
that state capture by interest groups and state intervention to extract rents are
complementary on the macro level in transition economies); 0. Becerra, E. Cavallo & C.
Scartascini, The Politics of Financial Development: The Role of Interest Groups and
Government Capabilities, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 626, 632-33, 639 (2012) (finding that, in
a sample of ninety-seven countries, the influence of interest groups on financial
development is dependent on government capabilities (measured by the quality of the
bureaucracy)); Michael S. Rocca & Stacy B. Gordon, Earmarks as a Means and an End:
The Link between Earmarks and Campaign Contributions in the U.S. House of
Representatives, 75 J. POL. 241-53 (2012) (showing that members of U.S. Congress use
earmarks to reward loyal contributors, whereas interest groups attract earmarks by
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V. China as a Case Study
In this section, we use China as a case study to illustrate our
framework because China's financial policies are among the most
distorting across the world. According to Huang and Ji, "China's
financial liberalization is among the lowest in the world."'94 More
specifically, the banking sector continues to be dominated by state
ownership.'95 In addition, interest rates are still influenced by the
government. Even though interest rate liberalization was formally
completed in China by 2015, Tan, Ji, and Huang caution that
the de jure completion of interest rate liberalization has generated
little impact on the Chinese financial system ... commercial
banks still stick to the official benchmark rates set by the PBOC,
although they are not required to do so anymore, at least in theory.
Both deposit rates and loan rates have stayed nearly the same as
those before reform.'96
Moreover, credit allocation in China is also heavily influenced
and is more determined by political factors than by commercial
motives. Because of political influence, there is "a systemic,
pervasive, persistent bias in financial policies in favor of the least
efficient firms in the Chinese economy-SOEs-at the expense of the
most efficient firms in the Chinese economy-China's small,
entrepreneurial, and private enterprises."' In other words, "the
lending policy and practices of China's formal financial institutions
were designed to deter, if not entirely block, the rise of the private
contributing to legislators' campaigns); Russell S. Sobel & J.R. Clark, Interest Group
Activity and Government Growth: A Causality Analysis, 36 CATO J. 3, 507-33 (2016)
(reporting that in the United States, there is a bidirectional causality between federal
spending and two measures of the value of resources devoted to interest group activity
[lobbying expenditure and the payroll of political/lobbying organizations located in
Washington, D.C.]); Debraj Ray, What's New in Development Economics?, 44 AM.
EcONOMIST 2, 3-16 (2000) (for a more general discussions on the relationship between
complementarity and multiple equilibria); Xavier Vives, Complementarities and Games:
New Developments, 43 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 437, 438-39 (2005).
194 Yiping Huang & Yang Ji, How will Financial Liberalization Change the Chinese
Economy? Lessonsfrom Middle-income Countries, 50 J. ASIAN ECON. 27, 29 (2017).
195 Barry Naughton, Is China Socialist?, 31 J. ECON.PERSP. 3, 8 (2017) (reporting that
by 2014, the Chinese government controlled at least 85% of banking sector assets).
196 Yuyan Tan, Yang Ji & Yiping Huang, Completing China's Interest Rate
Liberalization, 24 CHINA & WORLD EcON. 1, 2 (2016).
197 Yasheng Huang, Do Financing Biases Matterfor the Chinese Economy?, 26 CATO




The argument that the private sector is financially disfavored in
China is further supported by certain statistical evidence. For
example, Brandt and Li found that compared with township and
village enterprises ("TVEs"), which are set up and owned by local
township governments, private firms (as well as later privatized
TVEs) were significantly less likely to obtain loans, received
smaller loans, and were subject to higher loan standards.'9 9 For
unlisted manufacturing firms in China, state ownership is found to
be still significantly and positively associated with a firm's
likelihood of having long-term debt (but not short-term debt), as
well as a higher leverage ratio.200 Based on a data set covering more
than 20,000 Chinese firms over the 1998 to 2005 period, Poncet,
Steingress, and Vandenbussche find that private firms significantly
relied on their cash flow to finance their investment, which is
evidence of credit constraints, whereas SOEs did not.201 The
financial discrimination against private enterprises appears to have
continued or even worsened after 2008, when the Chinese
government adopted a gigantic stimulus plan, which favored
infrastructural projects as well as other local-government-sponsored
projects.202
These distorted financial policies have severely undermined
China's prospects of economic growth by misallocating financial
resources. There is large evidence of the negative economic
consequences of this financial misallocation. Bas and Causa find
198 VICTOR NEE & SONJA OPPER, CAPITALISM FROM BELOW: IARKETS AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN CHINA 96 (2012).
199 Loren Brandt & Hongbin Li, Bank Discrimination in Transition Economies:
Ideology, Information, or Incentives?, 31 J. COv. EcoN. 387, 388-91 (2003).
200 Kai Li, Heng Yue & Longkai Zhao, Ownership, Institutions, and Capital
Structure: Evidencefrom China, 37 J. COMP. EcON. 471, 475 (2009).
201 Sandra Poncet, Walter Steingress & Hylke Vandenbussche, Financial Constraints
in China: Firm-Level Evidence, 21 CHINA ECON. REv. 411, 412 (2010).
202 See Risto Herrala & Yandong Jia, Toward State Capitalism in China?, 14 ASIAN
EcoN. PAPERS 163 (2015) (discussing economic policies that favored state capitalism as
opposed to a private market economy); Anders C. Johansson & Xunan Feng, The State
Advances, the Private Sector Retreats? Firms Effects of China's Great Stimulus
Programme, 40 CAMBRIDGE J. EcoN. 1635 (2016) (finding that state enterprises had better
access to short and long-term loans than private sector enterprises after the economic
policy change of 2008); Ivan Roberts & Andrew Zurawski, Changing Patterns of
Corporate Leverage in China: Evidence from Listed Companies, in 1 CHINA'S NEW
SOURCES OF EcoNoMIC GROWTH 271 (2016).
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that aligning financial policies in China to the average level
observed in OECD countries would result in labor productivity
gains of 6.5% in the manufacturing sector.2 0 3 It was also reported
that between 1985 and 2007, capital and labor misallocation
lowered aggregate non-agricultural TFP by an average of 20%, with
capital misallocation accounting for more than half of the total
loss.204 Another study shows that policy distortions in financial
markets caused an aggregate TFP loss of 19.2%.205 Several
empirical studies therefore show that financial distortions have been
harmful to China's economic growth.2 0 6
In this section we will test the previously presented theoretical
model explaining the emergence of financially distorting regulation
for the case of China. We first focus on the role of the Chinese
Party-State (A) as the supplier of financially distorting regulation;
next we discuss the role of interest groups on the demand-side of
203 Maria Bas & Orsetta Causa, Trade and Product Market Policies in Upstream
Sectors and Productivity in Downstream Sectors: Firm-Level Evidencefrom China, 41 J.
COMP. EcN. 843, 845 (2013).
204 Loren Brandt, Trevor Tombe & Xiaodong Zhu, Factor Market Distortions Across
Time, Space, and Sectors in China, 16 REv. EcoN. DYNAMICS 39, 52 (2013).
205 Guiying (Laura) Wu, Capital Misallocation in China: Financial Frictions or
Policy Distortions?, 130 J. DEV.EcoN. 203, 211 (2018).
206 See Genevieve Boyreau-Debray, Financial Intermediation and Growth: Chinese
Style (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3027 2003) (suggesting that state-
level credit of the banking industry actually harmed provincial economic growth); see also
Alessandra Guariglia & Sandra Poncet, Could Financial Distortions Be No Impediment o
Economic Growth after All? Evidencefrom China, 36 J. CoMP. ECON. 633-57 (2008);
Diego Anzoategui, Mali Chivakul & Wojciech Maliszewski, Financial Distortions in
China: A General Equilibrium Approach (IMF Working Paper, WP/15/274 2015). But
see Yiping Huang & Xun Wang, Does Financial Repression Inhibit or Facilitate
Economic Growth? A Case Study ofChinese Reform Experience, 73 OFORD BULL. EcoN.
& STATS. 833-55 (2011) (finding that the role ofFDP is more complicated. Huang and
Wang show that the connection between financial distortions and economic growth is
changeable: they initially promoted economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s but have
inhibited economic growth over the 2000s); see also Guangdong Xu & Binwei Gui, The
Connection between Financial Repression and Economic Growth: The Case of China, 12
J. COMP. ASIAN DE. 385 (2013) (demonstrating that China's distorted financial system
acts as a double-edged sword: interest rate controls contribute to economic growth by
lowering the cost of capital, and exchange rate distortion promotes economic growth by
stimulating exports; conversely, credit misallocation and state ownership in the banking
sector retard economic growth by damaging economic efficiency); Guangdong Xu &
Binwei Gui, Does Financial Repression Retard China's Economic Growth? An Empirical
Examination, in THE ROLE OF LAW AND REGULATION IN SUSTAINING FINANCIAL MARKETS
73, 73-97 (Niels Philipsen & Guangdong Xu eds., 2014).
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regulation in China (B).
A. The Role of the Chinese Party-State
1. Promoting Inefficient SOEs
China is certainly a non-democratic regime. China specialists
have used different labels to describe the essential nature of the
regime, such as "market-Leninism," "neo-Leninism," "soft-
authoritarianism," "neo-authoritarianism," "resilient-
authoritarianism," and "developmental autocracy."207 Regardless of
the terms used by these specialists, a consensus reached is that, at
its core, China remains a Leninist party-state in which the
Communist Party of China (hereafter "the Party") plays the leading
role in political life and enjoys a monopoly of power by excluding
all other parties. According to the Polity IV scale, which is a score
assigned to each country based on its level of democracy versus
autocracy within its political system, with 10 indicating "strongly
democratic" and -10 indicating "strongly autocratic," China's score
in 2010 was -7.208 As we have shown in the previous section,
financial distortions have been used by authoritarian leaders to
sustain their rule by allocating financial resources to their
supporters. This logic also applies to China. The Party establishes
a patronage system through which loyalty and support can be
bought by material and non-material benefits, which in turn demand
an economic system in which economic rents can be created
continually, distributed selectively, and protected effectively. FDP
are part of the story.
State-related institutions, particularly SOEs, are perhaps the
most important mechanism through which economic rents and
loyalty can be exchanged. The role of SOEs in maintaining the
communist regime is so important that they are identified as
belonging to the core of the party-state complex of elite
institutions.2 09 Tsai and Naughton similarly argue that "State-
owned firms have emerged as a crucial component of a revitalized
Communist Party system, and SOEs are looked on with renewed
207 Minxin Pei, How China Is Ruled?, 3 AM. INT. 44, 48 (2008).
208 See POLITY IV COUNTRY REPORT 2010: CHINA,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/China2010 [https://perma.cc/G8JW-NT7C].
209 Barry Naughton, Inside and Outside: The ModernizedHierarchy that Runs China,
44 J. Comp. EcON. 404, 410-11 (2016).
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favor as one of the pillars of this revitalized but still authoritarian
and hierarchical system."210 InPei's words, "without its ability to
hand out economic rents, the Party would surely lose the loyalty of
its supporters and its ability to retain power. Thus, the Party keeps
extensive and tight control over China's state-owned enterprises so
that it can dole out political patronage."2 1 1 In the reform and open-
up era, the Party successfully recreated a system of political
patronage when the process of economic reform and market
transition took away the monopoly over the distribution of
patronage resources that political elites had enjoyed before 1978,
and SOE-related jobs and incomes constitute an important
component of this new system.2 12
On the management level, CEOs of SOEs, particularly of SOEs
controlled by the central government (the so-called central SOEs,
"CSOEs"),are rewarded with high income and elite positions inside
the party-state for their loyalty and support. These SOEs are
supervised by the State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission ("SASAC"), an authority that was
established by the State Council in 2003 to undertake the
government's functions as investor and owner of state assets. The
other SOEs are supervised by local SASACs.2 1 3 In terms of income,
an article shown on the website of the China Daily, which is the
mouthpiece of the Chinese government, claims that
[s]tatistics showed the average annual salary of executives at
centrally administered SOEs ranged from 600,000 ($105,691) to
700,000 yuan in 2010 and 2011. Considering that some SOEs
prosper on state support, these salaries were unreasonably higher
than those of government civil servants. In addition to the much-
envied high salaries, what has most irritated the public has been
the so-called 'invisible income,' such as transportation and
21o Kellee S. Tsai & Barry Naughton, Introduction, in STATE CAPITALISM,
INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION, AND THE CHINESE MIRACLE 10, 10-11 (Barry Naughton &
Kellee S. Tsai eds., 2015).
211 Minxin Pei, Is CCP Rule Fragile or Resilient?, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 27, 33-34
(2012).
212 Barry Naughton, A Political Economy ofChina'sEconomic Transition, in CHINA'S
GREAT EcON. TRANSFORMATION 91, 95 (Loren Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2008).
213 See Guangdong Xu & Binwei Gui, Why are China's State-Owned Enterprises o
Profitable? A Financial Repression Perspective, in MARKET INTEGRATION: THE EU
EXPERIENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY REFORM IN CHINA (Niels Philipsen,
Stefan E. Weishaar & Guangdong Xu eds., 2016).
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communication allowances and other material benefits that SOE
officials enjoy.214
In terms of positions, a number of positions in several elite
government and party bodies is reserved for leaders of the CSOEs:
twenty-two managers were nominated as representatives to the
Eleventh National People's Congress (legislature), and ninety-nine
managers, to the Eleventh Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference ("CPPCC"). 215 According to the Chinese government,
the CPPCC "is an organization of the patriotic United Front of the
Chinese people" and "conducts political consultations on major
state policies and important issues concerning the well-being of the
people, and exercises democratic supervision through proposals and
criticisms."216
A significant number of leaders from CSOEs are also
represented in important Party platforms,2 1 7 such as the Central
Committee.2 18  For workers of SOEs, compared with their
counterparts in the private sector, their average wage level is much
higher (CNY 23,565 versus CNY 14,096 in 2007), and the growth
rate of their average wage is also faster (259.8% versus 178.2%
between 1992 and 2007).219 Therefore, it is not surprising to find
214 China Targets High Salaries at State Firms, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 20 2014, 11:23
A.M.) http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-08/20/content_18453862.htm
[https://perma.cc/F6FK-RYCG].
215 Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions:
Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REv. 697, 727
(2013).
216 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference: Process of Founding and
Key Achievements in History, NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG.,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/27750.htm [https://perma.cc/5Q38-QESB]. But see
Minglu Chen, From Economic Elites to Political Elites: Private Entrepreneurs in the
People's Political Consultative Conference, 24 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 613, 616 (2015) (the
CPPCC and its local branches are commonly viewed as a "flower vase" or rubber-stamp
organization with no real power except to window dress).
217 See Jianyu Wang, The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China's State-
Owned Enterprises, 47 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 631, 660 (2014) (reporting that as of 2010,
twenty-three of China's thirty-one provinces had governors or vice governors who had
worked as SOE executives. For these former executives, the new positions "greatly extend
their career ladders in the party-state hierarchy, bringing them more prestige and a higher
political status").
218 Kjeld Erik Bradsgaard, Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The
Party in Control?, 211 CHINA Q. 624, 625 (2012).
219 Suqin Ge & Dennis Tao Yang, Changes in China's Wage Structure, 12 J. EUR.
EcoN. Ass'N. 300, 308 (2014).
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that employees in the state sector show more support for the party-
state than their counterparts in the private sector. Chen and Lu
report that
there was a significant, negative correlation between employment
in the state apparatus and support for democracy and
democratization within the general population. In other words,
those who were employed by the state sector (government and
party agencies, state-owned enterprises, and public organizations)
were less likely to support democracy than those who worked
outside of the state sector.220
Given the authoritarian nature of the current regime, rejection of
democracy seems to imply consent for the status quo.22 1
Motivated by the economic and political benefits and
constrained by the control and discipline from the Party, SOEs serve
the interests of the Party enthusiastically and effectively. For
example, they are shown to help achieve social stability by
maintaining employment.2 22 Given the inefficiency223 and the heavy
policy burden (such as maintaining employment), it is hard for
SOEs to survive without certain governmental support, not to
mention profiting. Indeed, China's SOEs were so inefficient in the
220 Jie Chen & Chunlong Lu, Democratization and the Middle Class in China: The
Middle Class's Attitude toward Democracy, 64 POL. RES. Q. 705, 715 (2011).
221 Id. at 710.
222 Xianfen Huang, Ping Li & Richard Lotspeich, Economic Growth and Multi-
tasking by State-Owned Enterprises: An Analytic Framework and Empirical Study Based
on Chinese Provincial Data, 34 EcoN. Sys. 160, 161 (2010); see also Alexander
Ljungqvist et al., State Capitalism vs. Private Enterprise (NBER Working Paper, No.
20930 2015).
223 See JANOS KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
COMMUNsM (1992) (discussing the inefficiency of SOEs in general); Andrei Shleifer,
State versus Private Ownership, 12 J. EcoN.PERSP. 133, 138 (1998); see also William L.
Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey ofEmpirical Studies on
Privatization, 39 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 321, 380 (2001) (concluding that "research now
supports the proposition that privately owned firms are more efficient and more profitable
than otherwise-comparable state-owned firms"); Martin Hovey & Tony Naughton, A
Survey of Enterprise Reforms in China: The Way Forward, 31 ECON. SYs. 138, 138-40
(2007) (concluding that "ownership structure does significantly influence the performance
and value of Chinese firms" and that "state ownership is generally negatively correlated to
performance"); SHAHID YUSUF, KAORU NABESHIMA & DWIGHT H. PERKINS, UNDER NEW
OWNERSHIP: PRIVATIZING CHINA'S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 14 (2006) (positing that
"studies extending back into the latter half of the 1980s have repeatedly shown that the
efficiency and productivity of SOEs lag behind COEs [collectively owned enterprises],
TVEs [township and village enterprises], andjoint ventures").
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1990s that almost half were running losses. Subsequent divestment
and/or closure of thousands of small and medium-size SOEs
improved the situation, although 30% of the surviving SOEs
remained in the red in 2002.224 The situation has changed drastically
during the past decade, and the profitability of China's SOEs has
increased impressively. The reported average return on equity
("ROE") of an SOE in China jumped from only 2.2% in 1996 to
15.7% in 2007 before sliding back to 10.9% in 2009.225 From 2003
to 2011, the net profits of China's SOEs increased from CNY 320
billion to CNY 1.9 trillion, based on average annual growth of
25.2%.226 However, an increasing amount of evidence shows that
the major driving force behind the profitability of China's SOEs
consists of certain distorted economic policies that favor SOEs at
the expense of private enterprise development and the greater social
welfare. Several studies have argued that Chinese SOEs have been
highly profitable over the past decade because they enjoy
monopolies in upstream industries such as energy, raw materials,
banks, and telecommunications, whereas the downstream industries
such as manufacturing and other tradable sectors are largely
liberalized.2 2 7 As a consequence, in this vertical structure, upstream
SOEs are able to accumulate profits by extracting monopoly rents
from the downstream private sector businesses.228 The rent-seeking
by SOEs was possible also as a result of financially distorting
regulation, the central topic of this article.
In 2011, the Unirule Institute of Economics, a Beijing-based
independent think tank, issued a report systematically examining
the subsidies enjoyed by SOEs during the 2001-2009 period.2 2 9
224 YusuF, NABESHIMA & PERKINS, supra note 223, at 14.
225 China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society,
WORLD BANK AND THE DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTER OF THE STATE COUNCIL, CHINA
105(2013).
226 China SOEs Report Surge in Profits, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 24, 2012),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-10/24/content_15843638.htm
[https://perma.cc/F4ED-WVKF].
227 Xi Li, Xuewen Liu & Yong Wang, A Model of China's State Capitalism 4 (H.K.
U. Sci. & Tech., Working Paper No. 2015-12, 2015),
https://iems.ust.hk/assets/publications/working-papers-2015/iemswp20l5-12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UY2Q-D4GY]; Julan Du & Yong Wang, Reforming SOEs under
China's State Capitalism, in UNFINISHED REFORMS IN THE CHINESE ECONOMY 5-6 (June
Zhang ed., 2013).
228 Id. at 4.
229 See HONG SHENG & NONG ZHAO, CHINA'S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: NATURE,
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According to this report, from 2001 to 2009, SOEs paid CNY
305.98 billion less, on average, than what they should have paid out
as interest rates annually.230 In addition to lower interest rates, SOEs
also received other subsidies, including unpaid rents for nationally
owned lands that were given to SOEs at no cost or very low prices,
unpaid rents for nationally owned natural resources (such as oil,
natural gas and coal) that were extracted by SOEs at very low prices,
and direct governmental fiscal subsidies.2 31 From 2001 to 2009, the
total subsidies directed to SOEs were CNY 6,144.3 billion.
23 2 If the
benefits derived from governmental policies favoring SOEs were
deducted from their nominal profits, the real profits of Chinese
SOEs would be in fact negative in the period from 2001 to 2009.233
In total, for the nine years from 2001 to 2009, CNY 2,753.85 billion
was not paid out as interest rates but was instead appropriated by
SOEs and included in their nominal profits.2 3 4 We also attempt to
estimate the scale of subsidies that flowed to SOEs from China's
banking sector, or more precisely, from Chinese citizens through the
banking sector in our previous work.23 5 We found that subsidies
(rents) from FDP are greater than the profits earned by SOEs in most
years from 1978 to 2012 if we assume that the real market interest
rate is 10%.236 Even if we follow Caprio, Atiyas, and Hanson, who
argue that financial distortions would most likely drive down
interest rates by two percentage points, and therefore use 2% as
the interest rate spread in most years, the financial distortion rents
remain more than 30% of the profits earned by SOEs.2 3 8
PERFORMANCE, AND REFORM xxi (2012).
230 Id.
231 Id. at 184.
232 Id at xxii.
233 Id. at 68.
234 Id.
235 See Xu & Gui, Why are China's State-Owned Enterprises o Profitable?, supra
note 213, at 146.
236 For a discussion on the reason for choosing 10% as the real market interest rate,
see Haibing Gu, Hongyan Shi & Wei Liu, woguo yinhang daikuan lily dejiegouxingfenxi
(A Structural Analysis of the Banks' Lending Rates in China), 3 XUESHU YANJIU
(ACADEMIC RESEARCH) 62-65 (2006).
237 GERARD CAPRIO JR., IZAK ATIYAS & JAMES A. HANSON, FINANCIAL REFORM:
THEORY AND EXPERIENCE 92 (1996).
238 See Xu & Gui, Why are China's State-Owned Enterprises o Profitable?, supra
note 213, at 158.
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2. Co-opting Private Enterprises
In addition to supporting the patronage system, the Party also
needs FDP to co-opt new social groups (such as private
entrepreneurs) whose economic power and social influence may
finally become a threat to the dominance of the Party if they are free
from the control of the Party. The attitude of the Party towards
entrepreneurs and their private enterprises seems to be
contradictory. As Haggard and Huang argue, "despite the well-
documented process of economic reform in China, the domestic
private sector remains relatively small and subject to a variety of
policy and economic constraints."239 Nee and Opper report that
during the first decade of reform, though the central government
encouraged household businesses (geti hu), it explicitly sought to
restrict private commercial activities to a peripheral role ....
Through the decade of the 1990s, the central government's policy
sought to contain the private enterprise economy as a peripheral,
subordinate sector of the Chinese economy .... Although in
2004 the government amended the constitution to confer to
private firms equality with state-owned enterprises and formally
guaranteed to 'protect the lawful rights and interests of the private
sector,' private property remained vulnerable.240
In general, "the political logic of reform in China was aimed at
safeguarding and protecting the public ownership economy."2 4 1
Entrepreneurs "were more like valued foster-children than part of
the family." 2 4 2 A plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that
the Party might reason that entrepreneurs endowed with economic
power and wealth today will gain political power in the future and
therefore pose a threat to the supremacy of the Party.243
Conversely, when Leninist parties such as the Communist Party
of China abandon class struggle for the sake of economic
modernization, they typically switch from an exclusionary to an
239 Stephan Haggard & Yasheng Huang, The Political Economy of Private-Sector
Development in China, in CHINA's GREAT EcoNomIc TRANSFORMATION 338 (Loren
Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2008).
240 NEE & OPPER, supra note 198, at 5-7.
241 Id. at 8.
242 RICHARD McGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA's COMMUNIST
RULERS 228 (2010).
243 YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE
REFORM ERA 349 (2003).
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inclusionary, or co-optive strategy.2" In the post-Mao period,
intelligentsia, technocrats, and particularly private entrepreneurs are
brought into the party-state system because they have the skills and
resources desired by the Party to accomplish its new policy agenda
(economic growth, technological improvement, etc.); in addition, it
is safer for the Party to place these newly emerging classes under its
direct oversight rather than leaving them to grow into certain
independent powers and finally become a threat to the dominance
of the Party.2 4 5 Chen and Naughton conclude that inclusiveness is
one of the pillars of the Party's claim to legitimacy.
2 4 6 More
specifically, they argue that
when a new social group emerges, the Party begins a political
process to incorporate that group into its governance structure.
'Inclusiveness' means that the Party has an obligation to listen to
and respond to the interests of new social groups and also that it
seeks to ensure that no social group can have an independent
power base to challenge the regime from the 'outside.' 247
Private entrepreneurs can be incorporated into the party-state
system through several channels. The first is to recruit private
entrepreneurs into the Party who then become so-called "red
capitalists."24 8 In the late 1990s, approximately 20% of
entrepreneurs were Party members, and by 2004, that number had
grown to almost 35%.249 This ratio has been shown to have
remained between 30% and 35% over the period between 2002 and
2012.250 It is worth noting that certain (or even most) private
entrepreneurs with Party membership actually joined the Party
before they started their business; they used to be affiliated with the
party-state in one way or another, such as being an official or a
244 Bruce J. Dickson, Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party
Adaptation, 115 POL. Sc. Q. 517, 519 (2001).
245 See id. at 524.
246 LingChen& Barry Naughton, A Dynamic China Model: The Co-Evolution of
Economics and Politics in China, 26J. CONTEMP. CHINA18,20 (2017).
247 Id. at 21.
248 Bruce J. Dickson, Integrating Wealth and Power in China: The Communist
Party's Embrace of the Private Sector, 192 CHINAQ. 827, 827-28 (2007).
249 Id. at 837.
250 Xuan He & Jun Ma, zhizhengdang dui siying qiye de tonghe celve jiqi xiaoying
fenxi (An Analysis on the CCP's Co-opting Strategy towards Private Enterprises and Its
Effects), 36(5) SHEUI (SocmTY) 179 (2016).
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manager in an SOE.25 1 These veteran Party members seem to be
more favored politically than their neophyte counterparts. For
example, Lu reports that veteran Party members are more easily
selected as delegates of the People's Congress at different levels.252
It is also worth noting that those private entrepreneurs who are not
Party members can still reach the party-state through their relatives,
friends, classmates, etc., who are themselves Party members and/or
officials.2 5 3 In addition to recruiting private entrepreneurs, the Party
also extends its tentacles to the grass-root level of private enterprises
by recruiting technicians and ordinary workers and establishing
Party branches in private enterprises.2 5 4 By 2009, there were 3.58
million Party members in private enterprises, with ordinary workers
accounting for 46% and management staff and technicians
accounting for 54%.255
The second channel is to elect private entrepreneurs to the
People's Congress ("PC") and the People's Political Consultative
Conference ("PPCC") at different levels.2 5 6 By 2004, nationwide,
over 9,000 entrepreneurs had been elected to the PC and 30,000 to
the PPCC at the county level and above.2 57  52% of private
entrepreneurs participate in China's political process by acting as
delegates of the PC, the PPCC, or the Party's congresses.2 58 37.47%
251 Peng Lu, siying qiyezhu ren renda daibiao huo zhengxie weiyuan de yinsufenxi
(An Empirical Analysis on the Impact Factors of Being Representatives in the People's
Congress and People's Political Consultative Conference for Private Entrepreneurs), 4
SKERUIXUE YANJIU (SOCIOLOGICAL STUD.) 168-72 (2013); see generally Xiangpeng Jin,
chushi zhengzhi ziben, renli ziben, yu siying qiyejia canzhengyizheng (nitial Political
Capital, Human Capital, and Private Entrepreneurs' Participation in Politics), 55(254)
ZHONGSHANDAXUE XUEBAO (JOURNAL OF SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY) 152-61 (2015)
(reporting a correlation between the previous affiliation with the party-state and possibility
of becoming an entrepreneur).
252 Lu, supra note 251.
253 Christopher A. McNally & Teresa Wright, Sources of Social Supportfor China's
Current Political Order: The 'Thick Embeddedness' of Private Capital Holders, 43
COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 189, 194-95 (2010).
254 Yingshuai Sun, zhongguogongchandangdangyuan shuliangyujiegou bianhuaji
fazhan qushi (The Change in Quantity and Structure of CCP Members and Their Trend),
5 BEIJING XINGZHENGXUEYUAN XUEBAO (JOURNAL OF BEIJING ADMINISTRATIVE COLLEGE)
31(2009).
255 Id.
256 See Dickson, supra note 248, at 843.
257 Id.
258 Jin, supra note 251.
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of private entrepreneurs are either PC delegates or PPCC delegates
(with an additional 16.68% who are Party members but not
delegates of the PC or the PPCC).259
Finally, private entrepreneurs may join government-sponsored
associations, such as the Private Enterprises' Association and the
All-China Industrial and Commercial Federation. A 2002-2004
study of rural private entrepreneurs reports that more than 70% were
members of at least one government-sponsored association.
2 60
Co-opted entrepreneurs are rewarded for their loyalty to and
cooperation with the party-state with certain economic benefits,
26 1
such as valuable financial resources. Numerous empirical studies
confirm that political connections, particularly membership in the
People's Congress, help private entrepreneurs to access bank credit
more easily and at a better price.26 2 Bai, Lu, and Tao find that
259 Lvjun Zhou,fuhaofenceng: siying qiyezhu de zhengzhi qianru moshijiqi diwei
rentong chayi (Symbolic Stratification: The Pattern ofPrivate Entrepreneurs' Political
Embeddedness and the Diference of Their Status Identification), 3 SHEHUI FAZHAN YANJIU
(CHINESE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 35 (2016)).
260 McNally & Wright, supra note 253, at 192.
261 Political connections may not only bring material benefits to private entrepreneurs
but may also protect private entrepreneurs from public enforcement of certain laws and
regulations. See, e.g., Henk Berkman, Rebel A. Cole & Lawrence J. Fu, Political
Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market
Regulation in China, 45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVEANALYSIS 1391, 1414 (2010) (explaining
securities market regulation); see also Xin Sun, Selective Enforcement of Land
Regulations: Why Large-Scale Violators Succeed?, 74 CINA J. 66, 66 (2015) (arguing
land regulation treats violators differently based on their political ties). Private
entrepreneurs may enjoy tax benefits as a result of their political connections. Wenfeng
Wu et al., Political Connections, Tax Benefits and Firm Performance: Evidence from
China, 31 J. AcCT. & PUB. POL'Y 277, 277-78 (2012). Political connections could also
undermine the role of trade unions in increasing wages. Yang Song, Jidong Yang & Qijing
Yang, Do Firms'Political Connections Depress the Union Wage Effect? Evidencefrom
China, 38 CHINA EcoN. REv. 183, 185-86 (2016). Private entrepreneurs having political
connections could also resort to courts more frequently in dispute resolution. See Yuen
Yuen Ang & Nan Jia, Perverse Complementarity: Political Connections and the Use of
Courts Among Private Firms in China, 76 J. POL. 318 (2014) (finding political connection
firms employ litigation more often than others). In summary, it is concluded that "for
private entrepreneurs, close ties to the party-state, such as strong personal guanxi or
kinship ties with power-brokers in the Party or membership in the Party and/or one of its
affiliated organizations, facilitate their ability to gain information, access credit, procure
licenses, avoid onerous taxes, and obtain land." McNally & Wright, supra note 253, at
196.
262 Studies that use different proxies for political connections confirm the importance
of political connections in helping private entrepreneurs address financial constraints. For
Party membership of entrepreneurs, see Hongbin Li et al., Political Connections,
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"access to bank loans is significantly easier for entrepreneurs who
are members of the Chinese People's Congress, but membership of
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference has a
limited effect."2 63  This conclusion is further supported by many
subsequent studies.2 " In addition to bank loan accessibility,
political connections are also shown to matter for private
enterprises' access to China's stock markets.265 Firms with political
connections reap other preferential benefits in the process of going
public, such as a relatively higher offering price, lower
underpricing, and lower fixed costs during the going-public
process.266
With the help of FDP, through which the party-state can
influence the direction of financial resources, the Party's co-
optation strategy seems to work considerably well, as co-opted
entrepreneurs show strong support toward the status quo in which
the Party enjoys monopolized political power.267 Private
Financing andFirm Performance: Evidencefrom Chinese Private Firms, 87 J. DEV. EcoN.
283, 296 (2008); Di Guo et al., Political Economy ofPrivate Firms in China, 42 J. Comp.
EcoN. 286, 300-01 (2014). For government intervention in CEO appointment, see Robert
Cull et al., Government Connections and Financial Constraints: Evidence from a Large
Representative Sample of Chinese Firms, 32 J. CORP. FIN. 271, 272 (2015). For top
managers (or board members) as officials at certain levels, see Zhong-Qin Su & Hung-
Gay Fung, Political Connections and Firm Performance in Chinese Companies, 18 PAC.
EcoN. REv. 283, 285-86 (2013).
263 Chong-En Bai, Jiangyong Lu & Zhigang Tao, Property Rights Protection and
Access to Bank Loans: Evidencefrom Private Enterprises in China, 14 EcON. TRANSITION
611, 623-24 (2006).
264 See, e.g., Wubiao Zhou, Bank Financing in China's Private Sector: The Payoffs
ofPolitical Capital, 37 WORLD DEV. 787, 797 (2009); Xin Sun, Jiangnan Zhu & Yiping
Wu, Organizational Clientelism: An Analysis of Private Entrepreneurs in Chinese Local
Legislature, 14 J. EAST ASIAN STUD. 1, 13-14 (2014); Deming Yang, Zhengfei Lu &
Danglun Luo, Political Connections, Media Monitoring andLong-term Loans, 7 CHINA J.
ACCT. REs. 165, 167 (2014); Xunan Feng, Anders C. Johansson & Tianyu Zhang, Mixing
Business with Politics: Political Participation by Entrepreneurs in China, 59 J. BANKING
& FIN. 220, 223 (2015); Hongxin Zhao & Jiangyong Lu, Contingent Value of Political
Capital in Bank Loan Acquisition: Evidencefrom Founder-controlled Private Enterprises
in China, 31 J. Bus. VENTURING 153,170 (2016).
265 See, e.g., Qigui Liu, Jinghua Tang & Gary Gang Tian, Does Political Capital
Create Value in the IPO Market? Evidencefrom China, 23 J. CORP. FIN. 395, 398 (2013);
see also Guoping Li & Hong Zhou, Political Connections and Access to IPO Markets in
China, 33 CHINA EcoN. REv. 76, 77 (2015).
266 Bill B. Francis, Iftekhar Hasan & Xian Sun, Political Connections and the Process
of Going Public: Evidencefrom China, 28 J. INT'L MONEY & FIN. 696, 696 (2009).
267 See Jie Chen & Bruce J. Dickson, Allies of the State: Democratic Support and
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entrepreneurs with Party membership (and those who have applied
to join the Party, those who were formerly cadres, and those who
were formerly SOE managers) have significantly higher levels of
regime support than entrepreneurs who have no political affiliations
with the party-state.2 6 Private entrepreneurs, particularly co-opted
entrepreneurs, apparently also share similar viewpoints on a range
of political, economic, and social issues with communist officials.
2 6 9
Dickson then concludes that "China's private entrepreneurs and red
capitalists in particular are not only increasingly integrated into the
political system, they have views that are increasingly similar to
those of local Party and government officials, making them unlikely
agents of political change."2 7 0 Private entrepreneurs with Party
membership also have shown a much higher evaluation of the
Party's policies than entrepreneurs without such status.
271
B. The Role ofInterest Groups
Interest groups play an increasingly important role in China's
political arena, despite the Party's dubious attitude towards and tight
control over these groups.2 72 Li describes the current government-
society relationship in China as "weak government, strong interest
groups" and argues that "never in the six-decade history of the PRC
have interest groups been as powerful and influential as they have
been in recent years."2 7 3 Similarly, Lampton concludes that "on
issues both foreign and domestic, interest groups have become
increasingly vocal participants in the policy process," and "China's
bureaucracy has adapted to the proliferation of interests by
becoming more pluralized itself."2 74
Regime Support among China's Private Entrepreneurs, 196 CHINA Q. 780, 787 (2008).
268 Id. at 802.
269 Id. at 790--91.
27o Dickson, supra note 248, at 847.
271 He & Ma, supra note 250.
272 See, e.g., Tony Saich, Negotiating the State: The Development of Social
Organizations in China, 161 CHINA Q. 124, 126 (2000) (arguing that "while there is an
increasing acceptance of the social organization sector and its further development, senior
CCP leaders have made it clear that this is no free-for-all for society to organize itself to
articulate its interests. Rather they prefer that the sector be developed within a highly
restrictive legislative and organizational framework that ensures CCP and state control").
273 Cheng Li, The End of the CCP's Resilient Authoritarianism? A Tripartite
Assessment ofShyfing Power in China, 211 CHINA Q. 595, 613 (2012).
274 David M. Lampton, How China Is Ruled: Why It's Getting Harderfor Beying to
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1. SOEs and Local Governments
The most salient interest group that may influence China's
policy process consist of enterprises, particularly large SOEs.
Industry associations and chambers of commerce also matter for
policy outcomes to a certain extent.27 5 For example, Downs' study
on the relationship between China's national oil companies and the
party-state leads her to conclude that "the projects pursued by the
energy state-owned enterprises tend to shape the country's energy
policies rather than vice versa."2 7 6 Similarly, Cai reports a case that
China's National Electricity Corporation achieved a monopoly by
manipulating a grid remodeling project implemented by the Chinese
government to provide electricity to most peasants in the country.2 7 7
There is also evidence that leading wind turbine and solar panel
manufacturers or state-owned electricity utility companies have
shaped China's renewable energy policy process.27 8 Ingeneral,
Deng and Kennedy conclude that "all types of companies-state-
owned and private, Chinese and foreign-have become active in
every stage of the policy process, from setting the agenda to
identifying policy options and shaping regulatory
implementation."2 79 As a result: "policies for different sectors and
the broader economy have been shaped by corporate influence."2 8 0
They further report that "the Chinese government does not want to
be seen as being subject to lobbying, since it may imply a
vulnerability to pressure, the adoption of policy based on
particularistic interests, or even impropriety."281 Powerful interest
groups, such as large firms, therefore attempt to keep a low profile
Govern, 93 FOREIGNAFF.74,80 (2014).
275 See Guosheng Deng & Scott Kennedy, Big Business and Industry Association
Lobbying in China: The Paradox of Contrasting Styles, 63CHINA J. 101, 105-07 (2010);
Jianxing Yu, Kenichiro Yashima & Yongdong Shen, Autonomy or Privilege? Lobbying
Intensity ofLocal Business Associations in China, 19 J. CHINESE POL. SCI.315,318(2014).
276 Erica S. Downs, Business Interest Groups in Chinese Politics: The Case ofthe Oil
Companies, inCHINA'S CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: PROSPECTS FORDEMOCRACY
121, 137 (Cheng Li ed., 2008).
277 Yongshun Cai, Managing Group Interests in China, 129 POL. ScL. Q. 107, 118
(2014).
278 Wei Shen, Who Drives China's Renewable Energy Policies? Understanding the
Role ofIndustrial Corporations, 21 ENVTL.DEv. 87,96 (2017).
279 Deng & Kennedy, supra note 275, at 101.
280 Id. at 102.
281 Id. at 122.
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(under-reporting their political influence) when asked to estimate
their influences on policy outcomes.282
Local governments are another powerful interest group. As
noted by Li, "local governments in the coastal and inland regions
are political interest groups that exert strong influence in Beijing
and work to ensure that the central government adopts socio-
economic policies that advance their regional interests."
28 3
Economic policies issued by the central government are frequently
thwarted by local officials if these policies are in conflict with their
own policy priorities and objectives. For instance, when the central
government attempted to moderate excessive investment in
residential real estate by instructing local governments to limit the
increase in land prices, local leaders, particularly at the municipal
level, ignored or undermined these mandates because they were
heavily dependent on revenues gained from the leasing and sale of
land to finance local programs.284 Wang also finds that when the
Chinese central government attempted to address accelerated
investment growth by implementing an economic austerity policy
in 2004, eight provinces intentionally resisted it by delaying its
enforcement or altering the policy to fit their interests.285
Both enterprises and local governments have a strong incentive
to lobby for a distorted financial environment. For enterprises,
financial distortions such as artificially lower interest rates may
contribute to their earning capability by lowering the cost of capital.
Indeed, enterprises-particularly SOEs-benefit greatly from
China's interest rate controls. Ma and Yi find that net interest
payments as a share of GDP by the non-financial corporate sector
dropped by 50% between 1992 and 2007.286 As a result of the
financial distortions, Chinese enterprises receive an implicit subsidy
in the form of artificially low costs of capital.2 8 7 The low cost of
financing has led to a significant increase in the profitability of
282 See id.
283 Li, supra note 273, at 613.
284 NICHOLAs LARDY, SUSTAINING CHINA'S EcoNoMiC GROWTH AFTER THEGLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRIsIs (2012).
285 See Chia-ChouWang, Pioneering, Bandwagoning and Resisting: The Preferences
and Actions of Chinese Provinces in the Implementation of Macroeconomic Regulation
and Control Policies,24 J. CONTEviP. CHINA315,331(2015).
286 See Guonan Ma & Wang Yi, China's High Saving Rate: Myth and Reality, 122
INT'LEcoN.5,20 (2010).
287 See also Huang, supra note 18; Huang & Tao, supra note 18.
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enterprises since the early 1990s.28 8  The ratio of profits to
"industrial value added rose from an average of 22.6% over the
1995-1999 period to 34.4% in 2008; the share of enterprise income
in GDP rose from 14.2% in the second half of the 1990s to 22.9%
in 2008."289
Local governments may also prefer certain inefficient financial
policies, such as lower interest rates and devalued currency, both of
which can be relied on to boost local economic growth. Economic
growth is important because economic goals, such as GDP growth,
tax collection, and Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI") inflow have
long been used by the party-state as performance targets that are
tightly correlated with the prospects for promotion of local officials
and that therefore incentivizes them to pursue economic growth at
any cost.2 90 For example, Li and Zhou show that the likelihood of a
provincial leader being promoted increases with better economic
performance (measured by GDP growth), whereas the likelihood of
termination decreases their economic performance.2 91 However,
other scholars find no evidence that strong growth performance was
rewarded with higher bureaucratic ranks.292 Instead, these authors
find that factional ties with top leaders, educational qualification,
and provincial revenue collection play substantial roles in cadre
promotions.293  A more balanced conclusion is reached by Jia,
Kudamatsu, and Seim, who find that "connections and performance
are complements in the Chinese political selection process."294
Local governments may also prefer credit discrimination which
can be used by local officials to distribute patronage. Enterprises
and local governments may even collude with each other and
288 See Dennis Tao Yang, Aggregate Savings and External Imbalances in China, 26
J. ECON. PERSP. 125, 133-34 (2012).
289 Id. at 134.
290 See, e.g., Hongbin Li & Li-An Zhou, Political Turnover and Economic
Performance: The Incentive Role ofPersonnel Control in China, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1743
(2005).
291 Id
292 Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph & Mingxing Liu, Getting Ahead in the
Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China,
106. POL. Sc. REv. 166, 166 (2012).
293 Id.
294 Ruixue Jia, Masayuki Kudamatsu & David Seim, Political Selection in China: The
Complementary Roles of Connections andPerformance, 13 J. EUR. EcoN. Ass'N 631, 634
(2015).
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pressure the central government to adopt certain distortionary
policies, such as an undervalued exchange rate that benefits both
exporting enterprises and coastal provinces where these enterprises
are located.29 5 Kaplan concludes that Chinese policymakers are
reluctant to pursue greater exchange rate flexibility because "the
manufacturing sector's strong performance has boosted the wealth
and influence of coastal regional governments, spurring them to
advocate for an extension of preferential exchange rate policies to
their regions from the central government."2 96 Similarly, Steinberg
and Shih argue that China keeps its exchange rate undervalued
because the interest groups that support undervaluation (a coalition
consisting of tradable industries, coastal provincial governments,
and certain governmental agencies, such as the Ministry of
Commerce and the most powerful National Development and
Reform Commission) are more powerful than those that oppose
undervaluation (such as China's central bank, the People's Bank of
China, which represents the interests of the banking sector).29 7
2. Factions within the CCP
Financial policies are not only influenced by interest groups that
are outside the party-state system (such as exporting enterprises) or
that are at the low or intermediate level of the political hierarchy
(such as local governments).298 Financial policies are also shaped
by the preferences of certain interest groups at the highest level of
the party-state. More precisely, financial policies are determined by
struggles between factions inside the Party. As a Leninist
organization, the Party is supposed to maintain an extremely high
level of solidarity and unity with the help of severe discipline, clear
hierarchical structure, and more importantly, the so-called principle
of "democratic centralism."2 9 9 The core of "democratic centralism,"
as defined by the Party's Constitution, is
295 See, e.g., Stephen B. Kaplan, The Political Obstacles to Greater Exchange Rate
Flexibility in China, 34WORLDDEV. 1182, 1193 (2006); David A. Steinberg & Victor C.
Shih, Interest Group Influence in Authoritarian States: The Political Determinants of
Chinese Exchange Rate Policy, 45COMP.POL. STUD. 1405,1421 (2012).
296 See Kaplan, supra note 295, at 1196.
297 Steinberg & Shih, supra note 295, at 1407.
298 See, e.g., Susan Lawrence & Michael Martin, Understanding China's Political
System, CONG. REs. SERV.,35(2013).
299 See Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Nov. 14, 2002, art. 3.
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individual Party members are subordinate to the Party
organization, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the
lower Party organizations are subordinate to the higher Party
organizations, and all the constituent organizations and members
of the Party are subordinate to the National Congress and the
Central Committee of the Party.300
However, this is far from reality. As numerous studies have shown,
intra-elite struggles and factional politics are important in
understanding the history of the Party.o
Factional politics reached a new level after 1978, when China
began to gradually move away from rule by a single leader (such as
Chairman Mao) and toward a collective form of leadership.3 0 2
Recent leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were to a large
extent merely "first among equals" in their respective generations
of collective leadership and could hardly wield the sort of power
enjoyed by Mao (or Deng Xiaoping). Rather, newer leaders have
had to govern the Party through coalition-building and political
compromise; as a result, factional politics prevails in the political
arena. However, since he became the general secretary of the Party
in 2012, Xi Jinping has changed the political status quo to a certain
extent with his bold anti-corruption campaign and his aggressive
300 Id. art. 10 § 1.
301 See Andrew Nathan, A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics, 53 CHINA
QUARTERLY 34, 50 (1973); Tang Tsou, Prolegomenon to the Study ofInformal Groups in
CCP Politics, 65 CHINA Q. 98, 110 (1976) (the seminal works on this issue). For more
recent studies, see JING HUANG, FACTIONALISM IN CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICS (2000);
JOSEPH FEWSMITH, ELITE POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2001); ZHIYuE Bo, CHINA'
ELITE POLITICS: POLITICAL TRANSITION AND POWER BALANCING (2007); VICTOR SHIH,
FACTIONS AND FINANCE IN CHINA: ELITE CONFLICT AND INFLATION (2008); see also
Andrew Nathan & Kellee S. Tsai, Factionalism: A New Institutional Restatement, 34
CHINA J. 157, 157 (1995) ("For twenty-two years scholars have found the factionalism
model useful as a starting point for analyzing how Chinese elite politics work."); Lowell
Dittmer, Chinese Informal Politics, 34 CHINA J. 1, 5 (1995) (argues that factionalism
"constitutes a central, even modal, pattern of Chinese political behavior deeply rooted in
cultural and psychological security drives"); Victor Shih, Wei Shan & Mingxing Liu,
Gauging the Elite Political Equilibrium in the CCP: A Quantitative Approach Using
Biographical Data, 201 CHINA Q. 79 (2010) (tracking the biographies of all Central
Committee members of the Party from 1921 to 2007 and showing that even Chairman Mao
Zedong, the charismatic and all-powerful leader, could not maintain a commanding
presence in the Party elite after the establishment of the People's Republic).
302 According to the 2007 Party Congress Communiqud, "collective leadership" is "a
system with division of responsibilities among individual leaders in an effort to prevent
arbitrary decision making by a single top leader." Li, supra note 273, at 609.
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consolidation of power.30 3 It remains to be seen whether the form
of collective leadership can be maintained in the future.304
Factional politics influence the design and implementation of
economic policies, including financial policies. As Cai and
Treisman argued, "faction leaders sought supremacy within the
Party by demonstrating the effectiveness of their chosen policies
across the chessboard of China's territorial administration,"30 and
we therefore can witness "the temporal pattern of reform, which
ebbed and flowed with shifts in the factional balance of power."
Similarly, Ho concludes that "particular reform policies,
anticorruption measures, and even corporate decisions in specific
markets are increasingly used as political weapons in high-level
political struggles.""
The path of Chinese financial reform in the mid-1990s was
shaped by a series of short-term political calculations aimed at
strengthening the power of individual leaders, or more specifically,
the former Premier Zhu Rongji (and his faction).0 Zhu's faction
(and factions with similar preference, i.e., central control over
policy tools, including financial resources) has been defined as the
"technocratic faction" (they are mainly central bureaucrats who
have ranks of vice minister or above).3 09 Another faction, which is
termed the "generalist faction"310 consists of provincial leaders who
have the strongest control over the Party apparatus and who prefer
to decentralize financial power so that their followers at local levels
may access bank loans to boost local economic development. Such
303 See, e.g., U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, The
Consolidation ofPolitical Power in China UnderXiJinping: Implicationsfor the PLA and
Domestic Security Forces, Feb. 16, 2019 (testimony by Timothy R. Heath).
304 For more detailed discussions on this issue, see CHENG LI, CHINESE POLITICS IN
THE XI JINPING ERA: REASSESSING COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP (2016); see also SEBASTIAN
HEILMANN & MATTHIAS STEPAN, CHINA'S CORE EXEcuTIVE: LEADERSHIP STYLES,
STRUCTURES AND PROCESS UNDER XI JINPING (2016).
3o5 Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Did Government Decentralization Cause
China's Economic Miracle?, 58 WORLDPOL. 505, 507 (2006).
306 Id.
307 Wing-Chung Ho, What Analyses ofFactional Politics of China Might Miss When
the Markets Becomes a Political Battlefield: The Telecommunication Sector as a Case in
Point, 13 CHINA REV. 71, 85 (2013).
308 Victor Shih, Dealing with Non-Performing Loans: Political Constraints and
Financial Policies in China, 180 CHINA Q. 922, 922 (2004).
309 SHIH,supra note 301.
310 Id.
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factional ties have had a significant positive effect on the
distribution of bank loans to provinces during the reform era."'
The core of Zhu's reform strategy was to centralize power in
financial resource allocation. By consolidating financial power to
the central level (and depriving local officials of access to cheap
credit from banks), Zhu could use the distribution of financial
resources as a political bargaining chip at the Politburo level. With
control over financial resources, he could bargain either for political
support in the event of a setback, or for the promotion of a close
prot6g6, which would increase his post-retirement influence.312 In
addition, Zhu and his followers had a strong disincentive to carry
out fundamental financial reforms (eradicating financial distortions)
that could have benefited China's economy in the long-term but
could have potentially jeopardized short-term stability; after all,
their performance was evaluated by short-term results.3 1 3 The real
consequence of the so-called "financial reform" in the Zhu era was
therefore a consolidation of financial power and covering up the
fundamental problems (such as the Non-Performing Loans
problem) rather than conducting a market-oriented financial
overhaul.
It became even more infeasible to conduct serious financial
reform in the Hu-Wen era (2002-2012), thanks to the factional
conflict. Policy making and implementation became considerably
more difficult in the era, particularly when there was disagreement
or controversy among factions.3 14 It has been argued that since Hu
Jintao and Wen Jiabao took power, market-oriented liberalization
had been "minor."" 1 Therefore, the United States should be wary
311 Victor Shih, Factions Matter: Personal Networks and the Distribution of Bank
Loans in China, 13 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 3, 12 (2006).
312 His disciples, such as Lou Jiwei and Guo Shuqing, still play important roles in
China's economic decision-making. Lou was China's Minister of Finance between 2013
and 2016 and is now the Chairman of the National Council of Social Security Fund. Guo
was the Governor of the Shandong Province between 2013 and 2017 and is now the
Chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission ("CBRC") and deputy governor
(as well as the Communist Party chief) of China's central bank ("PBOC"). For the
relationship between Zhu and Lou and Guo, see David M. Finkelstein, Maryanne Kivlehan
China's Leadership in the Twenty-First Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, WILLY Wo-LAP LAM (2018).
313 Victor Shih, Partial Reform Equilibrium, Chinese Style: Political Incentives and
Reform Stagnation in Chinese Financial Policies, 40 COMP. POL. STUD. 1238,1247 (2007).
314 Li, supra note 273, at 609.
315 Derek Scissors, Deng Undone: The Costs ofHalting Market Reform in China, 88
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of "fake Chinese economic reform."3 1 6 Factional politics seems to
have continued to dampen the outlook of China's financial
liberalization in the Xi-Li era since 2012.317 Whereas it has been
argued that market-oriented reform has found new momentum after
the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress,3
1 8 which was held in
November 2013, a recent estimation of the reform performance of
the new generation of leaders concludes that "it is impossible to
resist the conclusion that the reform process overall has stumbled
and is in serious trouble."3 1 9 A plausible explanation lies in the fact
that there are two camps inside the decision-making circle, which
disagree on certain fundamental economic issues such as the
priority of economic growth (speed versus efficiency), the risk of
accumulating debt, and the model of SOE reform.
3 2 0 The conflict
between these two groups became public after the publication of an
article on May 9, 2016 in People's Daily. Because the author of this
article is believed to be the right-hand man of President Xi, and this
FOREIGN AFF. 24, 24 (2009).
316 Derek Scissors, The US Should be Wary ofFake Chinese Economic Reform, ISSUE
BRIEF 4014, 1 (2013).
317 This refers to the period where Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Party
in 2012 and Li Keqiang became premier.
318 According to the decision ("Decision on Major Issues Concerning
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms") reached by this conference, for the first time,
market forces are acknowledged to play a "decisive" role in resource allocation rather than
the "basic" role admitted by previous Party decisions. The to-do list laid out by the
decision is extraordinarily ambitious, comprised of sixty articles, and because each article
contains several specific policy initiatives, over 300 different policy initiatives. Basically,
every important economic issue is addressed by the decision, including the liberalization
of interest and exchange rates, the assignment of expenditure responsibilities between the
central and local governments, and the dividend policy of state-owned enterprises.
Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (Adopted at
the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Comm. of the Communist Party of China,
Nov. 12, 2013). This decision is available in Chinese at:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm
fhttps://perma.cc/7FSE-ZQSP]. An abridged version of the decision in English is available
at: http://english.court.gov.cn/2015-10/08/content_22130532.htm
[https://perma.cc/H5Q6-WLLD].
319 Barry Naughton, Xi Jinping's Economic Policy in the Run-up to the 19th Party
Congress: The Giftfrom Donald Trump, 52 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1, 3 (2017).
320 See Barry Naughton, Two Trains Running: Supply-Side Reform, SOE Reform and
the Authoritative Personage, 50 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1, 6 (2016); Barry
Naughton, Supply-Side Structural Reform: Policy-makers Look For a Way Out, 49 CHINA
LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1, 5 (2016).
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article openly criticized Premier Li Keqiang's policies,321 this event
is described as "a severe policy split in the leadership between Xi
Jinping, who favors pressing forward with reform now despite the
sagging growth rate of China's economy, and Premier Li Keqiang,
who is perceived to be pressing for short-term stimulus measures to
sustain higher growth rates and postponing reform."3 22 The
aftermath of this factional conflict on China's financial landscape
remains to be seen.
3. Demand and Supply
As this story of China shows, although China obviously has very
peculiar features, it also constitutes an interesting confirmation of
the thesis developed in sections II and III that financially distorting
regulation is the result of supply and demand for that particular type
of regulation. Indeed, both demand and supply factors influence the
design and implementation of FDP in China. Whereas the party-
state monopolizes the policy-making process, it is undeniable that
certain interest groups, such as large enterprises, local governments,
government agencies, and certain factions inside the Party, also
matter for understanding the evolution path of China's financial
policies. Actually, the difference between the demand side and the
supply side may be even blurred in the reality. For example,
Premier Zhu and his faction both demand FDP so that their power
base can be consolidated, but they also supply FDP as the main
decision-maker in the rule making process. Both local governments
and large enterprises32 are part of the party-state system. It may
321 President Xi and Premier Li are believed to be affiliated with different factions.
322 Alice Miller, 'Core'Leaders, 'Authoritative Persons, and Reform Pushback, 50
CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1, 9 (2016).
323 See Wang, supra note 217. All SOEs, big or small, are controlled by the party-
state through the following four mechanisms: (1) all or most of the top executives and
many other employees at SOEs are Party members, and the fundamental discipline of the
Party requires all Party members to comply with the Party line; (2) the Party decides the
appointment and promotion of the top executives of SOEs; (3) Party cells within the SOEs
convene meetings to make important decisions for the company and to ensure that the
operation of the company is consistent with the Party line; and (4) SOE executives accused
of wrongdoing are investigated by the Party and punished under Party discipline. For more
detailed discussions on the control of the Party, see McGREGOR, supra note 242 (2010);
Katharina Pistor, The Governance of China's Finance, in CAPITALIZING CHINA 30-65
(Joseph Fan & Randall Morck eds., 2012); Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 215. Even private
enterprises, particularly large private enterprises, are highly influenced or even experience
direct intervention by the party-state. See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng,
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therefore be reasonable to argue that supply side and demand side
mutually influence and reinforce each other, jointly contributing to
distorted financial regulation in China.
VI. Conclusion
We built a simple demand-supply framework to investigate the
political determinants of FDP across the world in this study. On the
demand side, interest groups play an important role in shaping
financial policies that may benefit these groups at the cost of
economic efficiency and social welfare in many countries, including
non-democratic countries but particularly democratic countries. On
the supply side, governments, particularly governments in non-
democratic regimes, embrace FDP enthusiastically because
economic rents created by FDP can be relied on to buy support from
certain constituents without which the rule of these regimes may be
imperiled. With the help of this framework, financial policies in
certain countries, such as China, where a highly distorted financial
environment has been maintained for decades, can be better
understood.
The analysis presented in this study implies that it is difficult to
reform (not to mention eradicate) FDP, despite their efficiency
losses. Indeed, inefficient economic policies will not be changed
just because they are inefficient.32 4 Any effort that attempts to
reform inefficient policies, such as FDP, will face formidable
challenges from their beneficiaries, such as enterprises that may
have access to cheap credit, banks that enjoy monopoly status, or
politicians who may exchange financial resources with political
loyalty. Unless the victims of FDP are politically more powerful
and better organized than the beneficiaries ofFDP, which is usually
highly unlikely, the disease of FDP can hardly be cured.
Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEo. L. J. 665, 667
(2015).
324 Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, Economic Backwardness in Political
Perspective, 100 AMv. POL. Sci. REv. 115, 115 (2006) (defining a "political replacement
effect," i.e., political elites will block beneficial economic and institutional change when
they are afraid that these changes will destabilize the existing system and make it more
likely that they will lose political power and future rents); Daron Acemoglu & James A.
Robinson, Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice, 27 J. EcoN. PERSP. 173,
189-90 (2013) (arguing that inefficient economic policies can be maintained because these
policies help to achieve a political equilibrium by creating and distributing economic
rents).
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Another implication is that democracy is not a panacea.
Whereas financial distortions are indeed less severe in democracies,
they do not vanish at all, thanks to the efforts of interest groups. As
the evidence has shown, even in the United States, where
democratic institutions are highly developed, financial policies are
consistently bent to serve the interest of certain groups. In other
words, for non-democratic regimes, a process of democratization
will not be accompanied automatically by a process of financial
liberalization and financial development. To accelerate financial
development, we need to both tie the "grabbing hands" of
politicians and tie the "grabbing hands" of powerful interest groups.
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